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INVESTMENT AND THE ANDEAN PACT:
FROM POLITICAL RESPONSE TO LEGAL STRUCTURES
TO SAFE HARBORS
Robert Carcano
Introduction
Economic development, by definition, involves profound
socio-political change.1 The development process in Latin America
attests to this salient fact.2 In spite of efforts to modernize,
benefits seemed to elude Latin American leaders.3 New international
structures had to be forged if economic development was to provide
solutions to myriad social concerns.
Regional economic integration was a needed step in creating such
structures. Integration promised that problems insurmountable nationally
would prove susceptible to regional solution. In the Latin American
context economic integration occurred simultaneously with
nationalism.4 Indeed, nationalism would create the foundation for a
new relationship. The new structures at the base of this relationship
assured investors that adherence to defined rules would create a safe
harbor.5
This study is in three parts. Part One explores the political
climate which reshaped the relationship between the developed West and
the developing Latin States. Part Two commences by addressing the
economic rationale which served as motivation for integration. It
proceeds to a discussion and analysis of the subregional entity referred
to as the Andean Pact. Part Three analyzes the various legal regimes
which Andean nations have adopted.
I. Background
A) The Growth of Foreign Participation
Latin American statesmen are quite sensitive to foreign influence in
national and regional development efforts. Effective development not
only must achieve its economic objective but also "must be under the
control of the state .... Development would not be authentic nor
politically acceptable if international cooperation contributed to a
perpetuation of financial and technological inferiority."'6
Dependency theorists had long maintained that foreign participation
in national development usurped national control in key areas of the
process. Foreign capital displaces national entrepreneurship, pre-empts
financing7 and allows the foreigner to abuse his unequal bargaining
position.8
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United States participation in the region, however, is a
post-Second-World-War phenomenon. From slightly over 5 billion dollars
in 1929, investment in the region increased to an estimated 13 billion by
the end of the fifties. Of this, 7.4 billion consisted of U.S. direct
investments. 9 The quantitative change which these figures represent
belied a more significant qualitative change. Before 1950, investments
within the Andean10 region were primarily directed at the extractive
industries. After 1950, the policy of import substitution triggered
pervasive foreign participation in manufacturing.
Import substitution policy aims at replacing foreign imports with
indigenous efforts. The process begins with finished consumer goods and
moves on toward higher stages of manufacture.11 Foreign transnationals
rapidly captured the advantages of this system and commenced active
participation in the manufacturing sector.12 Indeed, within the Andean
group, investment in the extractive industries rose "from 1.060 million
dollars to 1.137 million dollars between 1957 and 1967 while investments
in the manufacturing sector rose from 117 million to 396 million during
the same period."13 In this sense, foreign transnationals fostered
import substitution policy. However, they did not ascertain whether the
size of the market would permit economically efficient plants. To the
foreigner, protected by high trade barriers, questions of economic
efficiency were largely immaterial.14 The only immediate concern was
market penetration.
The result of this indiscriminate invasion of foreign
capital [into the import substitution process] on the
host state was disheartening. With all new production
targeted for the internal market, there was no
increase of exports yet there was also no reduction of
imports. Although the importation of finished
products was halted, the import of primary material
and intermediate products to manufacture the final
product was considerably augmented.15
Clearly, if foreign capital was to aid national development,
developmental strategy would have to address this element meaningfully,
delineating between necessary foreign participation and sensitive or
undesirable activity.
B) Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Concerns
Certainly, subversion of economic policy frustrated Latin American
leaders. Yet the practice of acquiring smaller and medium-sized national
firms was also a matter of grave concern.16 Between 1958 and 1967, for
instance, of 96 subsidiaries of foreign enterprises which initiated
activity in Columbia, only 48 were entirely new; 12 were unidentifiable
as to origin; one was a subsidiary of another while 35 were acquisitions
of firms already in existence. In Peru, a similar pattern was evident;
of 62 firms, 36 were entirely new while 23 firms were acquisitions of
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firms already in existence.17 Concomitant with these concerns was an
increasing inability of the host government to control either the
decisions of these foreign enterprises or the impact their decisions had
on the host state.18 The global stance of the true transnationals
enabled them to maximize profits globally without considering the
environments in which particular subsidiaries operate.19 And, of
course, the interest of the state is not a factor in the invisible hand's
search for profits.20
Studies conducted by the Chilean Corporation for Development
concluded that "55% of the foreign enterprises questioned responded that
it would not be feasible for them to export to the area's market since
they had subsidiaries operating in the majority of the states in the
area."'21 The result is de facto division of markets, not necessarily
in the nation's best interest. This same study concluded that 70% of
those firms consulted paid royalties (abroad) for the use of patented and
unpatented technology. 2  Providers of technology clearly had a unique
bargaining stance in Latin America.
Common contractual provisions used by foreign firms also became a
matter of concern. Tying agreements were often utilized as vehicles to
remit profits. Through such agreements, a subsidiary of a transnational
would be required to utilize an intermediate or primary product of
another subsidiary or of the parent. One study concluded that "if ...
[Columbia] could reduce the price of its intermediate product and capital
goods by ... at least 20%, it could have saved, in 1968, a sum equivalent
to 50% of all its exports, excepting coffee and petroleum."23
What enabled transnationals to perpetuate and further their interests
in this manner is the desirability of their technology. Such technology
enters the country in the form of goods or is transferred as technical
knowledge, formulas, drawings or know-how.
If it arrives as part of direct foreign investment,
two situations can arise. One is that technological
participation is remunerated as royalty payments which
are generally fixed as a percentage of volume of sale
of the respective products. The other possibility ...
is that technological participation is considered part
of capital which carries the right to retire the
capital and to remit profits.24
The effects of this are twofold. First equity participation of foreign
firms is augmented. Secondly, revenues to the host government are
severely diminished.
Inclusion of restrictive clauses also led to a widely held perception
that in bilateral negotiations between Andean States and the developed
world the latter had an insurmountable advantage.
It would be redundant, in regard to Andean buyers, to
state that [negotiating] ability is always on the side
of the provider, accustomed to negotiating with buyers
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who generally lack the most elemental information and
ignore what they are really buying and whether there
are other alternatives which could produce similar
products.25
Among the clauses most frequently employed were clauses prohibiting
export of products manufactured with the imported technology, tying
agreements and clauses prohibiting manufacture of products similar to
imported goods.26 The problem was clear:
Legislation on industrial property ... did not
consider tying an illegal activity ... ; laws
regarding patents and trademarks did not correspond to
the needs of development.27
C) Political Response: Expropriation
Economic change induces political and social unrest.28 In Latin
America, seemingly intractable social issues triggered a search for
causes. The legality of foreign activity came under increasingly closer
scrutiny and ultimately vehement attack.
Expropriation of property interests held, in large part, by
U.S.-based enterprises, has been largely a Latin American
phenomenon.29 More properly, expropriation has been a political
response30 to pervasive U.S. and Canadian presence in Latin States.
1) Relief in U.S. Courts: The Act of State Doctrine.
In January of 1959, Fidel Castro ascended to power in Cuba. What
followed was widespread expropriation of property held by American
interests. American firms sought relief in the courts. In 1964 the
United States Supreme Court reconsidered the act of state doctrine in the
case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.31 The decision and its
progeny served to highlight the fact that foreign investors would have to
seek a safe harbor in the same port where they sought to maximize
profits.32
a) Sabbatino
A U.S.-based commodity broker, Farr, Whitlock and Company
(hereinafter Farr), entered into a contract to purchase sugar from a
subsidiary of Azucarera Vertientes Camaguey de Cuba (hereinafter C.A.V.).
Congress had amended the Sugar Act of 194833 to permit the
President to reduce the Cuban sugar quota.34 Characterizing this act
as one of aggression, the Cuban government adopted Law No. 851, 35 which
justified retaliation against the property interests of U.S. nationals in
several specified companies, C.A.V. among them. Pursuant to Law No. 851,
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Cuban government consent was necessary before Farr could ship this
sugar. To obtain consent Farr entered into a novation wherein Cuba's
Bank for Foreign Commerce 36 was substituted for C.A.V. Subsequent to
this novation the Bank for Foreign Commerce assigned the bills to Banco
National.
National instructed its New York Agent to deliver bill and sight
draft to Farr against payment. Farr refused tender. C.A.V. then
notified Farr that it claimed the proceeds of the sale as rightful owner
of the sugar. C.A.V. obtained Farr's promise not to turn the funds over
to Nacional or its New York agent and in return C.A.V. would indemnify
Farr for any loss it suffered. Farr then accepted shipping documents,
negotiated the bills and received payment.
Farr was then served with an injunction issued by the New York
Supreme Court prohibiting it from taking any action which would remove
the funds from the State. Farr thereupon transferred the funds to
Sabbatino who had been appointed temporary receiver of C.A.V.'s New York
assets.
Nacional initiated a suit in Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York alleging conversion of the bills of lading. The
District Court held that Farr could not assert ownership against C.A.V.
before making payment. 37 Since the sugar was within Cuban territory,
C.A.V. had a property interest in the sugar subject to the territorial
jurisdiction of Cuba.38 However, the court, reasoning that a taking in
violation of international law did not convey good title, denied Cuba's
claim of title.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Although unwilling to declare that
any one of the infirmities found by the District Court rendered the
taking invalid under international law, the higher court found that such
was the effect in aggregate.39 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the act of state doctrine bars an inquiry into the
acts of a sovereign committed within its own territory.40 The Court
reasoned that the doctrine is dictated by the basic relationship between
the branches of government in a system of separation of powers.41 The
doctrine, explained the court, "concerns the competency of dissimilar
institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the
area of international relations."42 It is not compelled either by the
inherent nature of sovereign authority or by principles of international
law.4 3 Redress from expropriation, therefore, would have to be pursued
through the channels provided by sovereign powers as between themselves.
b) Hickenlooper Amendment
After the Sabbatino decision, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 to make clear that American Courts should not avoid
adjudicating the merits of a case because of the doctrine.44
Subsequent litigation sought to clarify the meaning and intent of the
legislation.45 This litigation made one thing painfully clear: the
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role of American courts in redressing expropriation of the property of
U.S. nationale abroad would be quite narrow. Sabbatino's "sliding
rule"'4 6 approach insured that the more politically sensitive an act,
the less likelihood of obtaining judicial relief.
This attitude on the part of the courts evinced a keen sensitivity to
political reality, a concern for judicial integrity and an awareness of
constitutional limitations.4 7 Coupled with the conciliatory approach
adopted by the Executive branch of government, judicial attitudes made
increasingly clear the need for new rules to clarify the role of foreign
capital abroad. If American (municipal) law was capable of articulation,
however, articulation of applicable international rules on expropriation
was difficult at best.
2) Differing Legal Standards on Expropriation
North American scholarship had articulated a duty between a sovereign
and an alien whose property has been expropriated. The sovereign may
expropriate property only to effectuate a proper purpose. Expropriation,
moreover, may not be discriminatory and provision must be made for prompt
payment of adequate compensation. 40 Latin American scholarship had
never accepted the existence of such a standard. As Professor Futuovros
indicates,
a second position, also based on traditional
international law and supported by the Latin American
State, views the international law requirement as of a
contingent character, states being bound to treat the
property of aliens in substantially the same manner in
which they treat the property of their own
nationals.49
Expropriations, therefore, are a departure from the principle of
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept). Agreements are inviolable
provided rebus sic stantibus (provided things remain as they were). 50
However, things had not remained as they were. There was an increasing
perception that the international economic order functioned to the
detriment of the new citizen states.51 These nations had not
participated in the formation of the economic order. They did not wish
to be subservient to it. The wording of expropriation decrees best
illustrates this new perception. In Bolivia's nationalisation of the
Gulf Oil Co., General Alfredo Quando Cundia stated:
[Tlhe ... fundamental charter of the state establishes
that the private accumulation of economic power in
such degree that it may place the economic
independence of the state in danger will not be
permitted; ... whereas the firm, Bolivia Gulf Oil
Company, has set itself up as a new super state, which
has at its disposal an economic and political power
greater than that of the Bolivian State, incompatible
with the principle and practice of national
sovereignty [it has violated this mandate].52
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The same rationale justified Allende's actions in Chile. The targets of
expropriation were those enterprises deemed to have a profound impact
upon development of the local economy. These included the extractive and
banking interests.53 Indeed, even before Allende, the fate of the
North American-based Anaconda Chilean operations had been decided.
During the 1964 Presidential elections the only real choice was between
nationalisation or Chileanization. When Eduardo Frei Montalvo won the
presidency, Chileanization became Law No. 16,425 on January 25, 1966.
The objectives included Chilean participation in the ownership and
control of copper producing enterprises via the Copper Corporation. 54
This changed perception was as pervasive as it was permanent. One
study by the Rand Corporation concluded that in Peru and Brazil military
training had created an expanded concept of national security: "Military
leaders began to perceive national security problems as extending beyond
conventional military operations in large part because many of the
existing social and economic structures seemed so inefficient or unjust
as to create conditions for and give legitimacy to revolutionary
protest, and hence, constitute a security threat. '&5  This expanded
concept of national security in the hands of a military man can be a
powerful persuader of civilian governments.
II. Regional Integration
A) The Search for Optimal Markets
Like their European counterparts, Latin American statesmen came to
realize that the success of countries like the United States was at least
partly attributable to the economies of scale made possible by large
internal markets. This rationale served as the impetus for Latin
American integration efforts.
Development would still necessitate industrialization. 56 Each
nation would have to pursue industrialization internally where access to
markets was not impeded. But before integration efforts could be
undertaken, a concerted effort had to be made to alter traditional trade
patterns. There had to be reorientation from importation of manufactured
goods from Europe and the United States (and exportation of cash crops
and raw materials) to development of regional industries which could
utilize the area's supply of primary production and satisfy the regional
demand for manufactured products. 57  This, at a time when import
substitution policy was being discredited.58 It was quite clear that
"unless the volume of sale reached a certain minimum, the cost per unit
and the price to the consumer would be high and capacity to compete
low."'59 However, it was becoming increasingly clear that, confined to
national boundaries, import substitution destroyed the benefits of
economies of scale. Basic semi-manufactures such as iron, steel,
chemical fertilizers, pulp and paper, and industrial and farm machinery
could be most effectively produced through economies of scale.60
Regional integration would also make possible region-wide
specialization of industry. Moreover, such specialization would replace
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monopoly and complacent national management with multi-plant
industries.61 However, integration would have to be handled
carefully. "In particular, if the great difference in degrees of
development which presently exist among developing countries are not to
increase, it is indispensable to devise special mechanisms in order to
ensure that the benefits of integration are equitably distributed among
the partner countries.''62
B) Integration Options
Creation of a regional market requires coordination of various
policies. Common policy on tariff and trade as well as common fiscal,
social and investment policy are critical. The development of
infra-structure, such as transport and communication networks, is also a
matter requiring coordination. Moreover, Latin American leaders realized
that the integration process in Europe offered no clues for the creation
of a Latin American market. In Europe, "the channels of trade were all
there, ready made ... facilities were available .... In Latin America,
on the other hand [it was] a matter of creating something that never
before existed. ''63 Nevertheless, a first decision had to be made,
namely what level of integration was most appropriate to the region.
Economic theory provided three integrative mechanisms: free trade areas,
common markets and custom unions.64
A common market represents the most pervasive and permanent level of
integration. Besides removal of internal tariffs and creation of a
common external tariff, barriers to mobility of capital, labor and other
such factors are also removed. Its increasingly irrevocable nature
encourages investment.
A free trade area eliminates tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade
among the members of the association while allowing each member to retain
its own commercial policy toward third-party nations. 65
A third mechanism, custom unions, combines the free trade area with a
common external tariff. The principal difficulty here revolves around
creation of the common tariff. Moreover, practically speaking, many
national laws impinge on trade. The union does not require agreement
except as to those laws which relate directly to trade.
1) Dissension from Within
Formulation of a regional integration policy demonstrated the wider
economic disparity in stages of development of potential member states.
The smaller and less developed member states had unique developmental
needs. Their participation under the Latin American Free Trade
Association convinced them that the economic predominance of the United
States has been replaced with that of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
Between 1962 and 1966 these three states, already holding an aggregate of
8C% of regional industrial production, doubled their net regional trade
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balance, primarily in the industrial sector. This is in contrast to the
middle powers who, with 17% of regional industrial production, doubled
their net regional trade deficit. The least developed states, with 3% of
regional industrial production, changed from regional creditors to
debtors.66 Lafta's annual negotiations on a product-by-product basis,
subject to reciprocity of benefits, favored Mexico, Brazil and Argentina
for several reasons:
(1) the size of their markets require greater
concessions
(2) the industrial products produced by L.D.C. are
not needed by the larger states and
(3) operation of the most favored nation clause.
Economic disparity was not unforeseen. In 1955 the U.N. Economic
Commission for Latin America proposed a draft which suggested recognition
of three distinct groups of nations "with the object of allowing the more
developed states in the area to grant special and transitory concessions
to the medium and lesser developed states ... ; however [when the Treaty
was implemented] the three categories were not established."67
Studies would later note that elimination of trade barriers furthers
the tendency of investments to concentrate in the more advanced countries
of the region. Factors such as the existence of a skilled labor force
and existing economic infra-structure almost guarantee higher returns on
capital.68 Concomitantly, participation in an integrated market denies
lesser developed states the protection usually afforded to nascent
industry.
In short, unless special measures are taken in favor
of the weaker country, the establishment of free trade
within a regional market would bring into operation or
stimulate cumulative processes similar to those which
have led the world in general to the existing patterns
of relationships between the developed and the
developing countries.69
Other scholars phrased the problem in other, more poetic, terms.
Professor Santos said:
We don't adhere to the Calvinist formula ... of "To he
who has, may more be given, and to he who has little,
what little he has he may be deprived of." On the
contrary, we think that equity lies in a distribution
of cost and benefits that favors most he that has
least. And not because of international philanthropy
but rather because we are certain ... that the
accelerated development of the weaker is a problem
that concerns all members of the community .... Seen
in this manner, equity is synonymous with collective
convenience, and should be practiced in the broadest
possible manner. 70
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2) Sub-regional Integration Efforts
With the meeting of the Presidents of America at Punta del Este the
concept of a sub-regional agreement came into focus. 71 The meeting
revealed a concensus on the creation of a Latin American Common Market
(to be in effect by 1985). This larger market was to come into being by
the convergence of LAFTA and the Central American Common Market.72 The
document contained two provisions worth noting. First, it envisioned the
participation of foreign capital.73 Secondly, it granted L.D.C.s the
right "to participate and to obtain preferential conditions in
sub-regional agreements."'74
Subsequent to this agreement on principle, the Conference of
Contracting Parties of the Latin American Free Trade Association,
pursuant to mandate issued by the Declaration of Presidents established
the norms by which sub-regional agreements would be judged.75 This
came in the form of Resolution 203. The Resolution sets out basic
principles by which sub-regional agreements were to be guided.76 By
Resolution 203,7 7 the Council of Ministers approved the outline of the
sub-regional agreement presented by Columbia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela. To effectuate the purposes of Resolution 202, the Conference
of Contracting Parties approved Resolution 222.78
The promotion of the sub-regional agreement had to legitimize the
relationship between the Pact and LAFTA. 79 Indeed, even before the
adoption of Resolution 203 a study conducted by a Chilean delegation to
LAFTA's Council of Ministers addressed this question.8 0 By giving the
agreement the character of a treaty mechanism, the member could profit
from application of the most favored nation clause without having to
reciprocate. Secondly, the agreements were effectuated by executive act
and, hence, legislative approval was bypassed. Since the Treaty of
Montevideo imposed upon the Committee the task of facilitating creation
of the Latin American Common Market,81
[i]t is evident that, at Punta del Este, the
Presidents of America resolved to put into execution
the programatic norms of Article 54 by adopting the
decision to accelerate the process of converting LAFTA
into a common market .... One of the many mechanisms
that could be adopted ... [is] precisely the
sub-regional agreement. These agreements ...
constitute a most efficacious means to create
conditions favorable to the establishment of a common
market.82
3) The Andean Pact - Structures
With these conceptual difficulties clarified, the path was cleared
for the Agreement of Cartagena8 3 and creation of the Andean Pact.
Chapter I of the Agreement states the purpose of the agreement to be
promotion of harmonic and balanced development of its member states in
order to facilitate creation of a common markt.
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Chapter II establishes the several bodies of the Treaty. The
principal bodies are the Commission and the Junta.84 The Commission is
the supreme body and is composed of one representative from each of the
member governments.8 5 It establishes the general policy of the
Agreement and adopts measures to effectuate it. The Commission
designates and removes the members of the Junta; it passes upon the
Junta's proposals and monitors for compliance with the Treaty of
Montevideo.96 The Commission meets three times a year and can be
called into special session bX petition of any state or the Junta. Any
such meetings are mandatory.
8
The Junta is the technical body. It is composed of three members who
serve for three year terms. The Junta represents the regional
interest.8 8 It fulfills the decisions of the Commission and formulates
proposals to facilitate compliance with the Agreement. Moreover, the
Junta is charged with formulating development mechanisms of special
application to the least developed of its members: Bolivia and
Ecuador.89 There is no requirement that the Junta's technical staff be
of Andean nationality. 90
Chapter III addresses how the Agreement is to be effectuated. It
speaks to common policy formulation regarding development strategy
91
and coordination of development plans9 2 through harmonization of
exchange, monetary, financial and fiscal policy (including regimes for
regional and foreign capital). 93
Article 27 called upon the Commission to approve and submit a common
regime for the treatment of foreign capital, trademarks, patents,
licenses and royalties, before December 31, 1970. Similarly, the
Agreement mandates a common regime for the treatment of multinational
enterprises94 and for the regulation of competition. 95
Chapter IV of the Agreement enumerates the savings clauses. They
mirror the clauses found in the Treaty of Montevideo.
96
Chapter V is addressed to trade liberalization. All tariffs and
other trade barriers of equivalent effect, whether of a monetary exchange
or administrative nature, are to be eliminated.9 7 It is for the Junta
to determine what acts constitute prohibited restrictions.
98
The liberalization program is automatic and irrevocable and it
encompasses all products. Total liberalization was to be accomplished by
December 31, 1980. The program of liberalization is to apply in
different measures to (a) products destined for the Sectoral Program of
Industrial Development [hereinafter SPID], (b) products on LAFTA's Common
List, (c) products not produced by any states in the subregion and (d)
products not comprehended by any of these categories.99
With the exception of restrictions applicable to products on SPID,
restriction of all types were to be eliminated by December 31,
1970.100 A special regime is created for Bolivia and Ecuador.
The Junta determines which products are to be reserved for sectoral
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development.10 1 Products listed on LAFTA's Common List were to be free
180 days after the effective date of the agreement. The Commission,
pursuant to the Junta's proposal, was to draw up a list of products not
produced within the subregion and not reserved for SPID and,
concomitantly, was to select those products reserved for Bolivia and
Ecuador.10 2 As to the list, these products were to be duty free by
February 28, 1971.
III. Safe Harbors
The Agreement of Cartagena, establishing the Andean Group, 103
mandates action that would remove the property interest of U.S. and
Canadian-based firms from the instability and uncertainty that
characterized expropriation. This mandate is found in articles 26 and
27.104 It was fulfilled by adoption of the Common Regime for Treatment
of Foreign Investments, Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties in
December of 1970 and ratified as Decision 24 on June 1, 1971.105 The
Code addresses a market in excess of 50 million people in an area half as
large as the United States.1 06
A) Foreign Investment
The Code's preamble recites much of what Punta del Este and the
Declaration of Bogota first enunciated:107 "[F]oreign capital and
technology can play an important part in subregional development to the
extent that it constitutes an effective contribution toward attaining the
objectives of integration and reaching the goals indicated in national
development plans."1 0 8 This, of course, proceeds from the realization
that integration will require foreign investment, which in turn must be
able to assess risks. Consequently, it is necessary to promulgate rules
setting out not only the advantages of integration benefiting national or
mixed firms10 9 but also the rights and obligations of foreign investors
including the guarantees that will protect them. The regime must work
for the mutual benefit of both investor and member countries.110
The Code is not simply a set of rules regulating foreign investment.
Rather, it is a general set of guidelines imposing affirmative
obligations on all member states. The goal is clearly to strengthen
national firms in order to enable them to participate in overall
development.111 Likewise, the Code imposes a general obligation upon
member states to implement standards and mechanisms which will attract
needed technology to national enterprises on reasonable terms1 12 and
allow national capital to participate in existing enterprises. Thus, the
Code brings development into national hands.113
Definitions provided by the Code apply not only to regulation of
foreign investment but also to other common regimes promulgated pursuant
to the mandate of Decision 24. A direct foreign investment1 14 is
characterized broadly rather than being defined in a limiting fashion.
It is a contribution made by a natural or juridical person to the capital
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of an enterprise either in freely convertible currency or through
industrial plants, machinery (new or used), spare parts, raw materials or
intermediate products.115 Also embraced are funds in local currencies
which are entitled to be transferred abroad and their reinvestments.
National investors1 16 are the state, national individual, national
non-profit entities and national enterprises. A foreigner can become a
national investor by establishing residency of not less than one year and
appearing before the competent national authority in order to renounce
the right to repatriate capital and to transfer profits abroad. An
investment made by a subregional investor will be considered equivalent
to a national investment if the investment was authorized by the
investor's country of origin and is submitted for prior approval of the
host (which requires certification of country of origin). A subregional
investor is a national investor of a member countryl7 different from
the host, whereas a foreign investor is defined as an individual of a
non-member country who owns a direct investment11 8 in a member-state.
A national enterprisel l9 is one not only organized in the recipient
country but also owned to the 80% level by national investors. There is
a proviso which is meant to insure actual compliance, that is that the
80% level be reflected in the technical, financial, administrative and
commercial management of the enterprises.
A mixed enterprise1 20 is one whose capital belongs to national
investors in a proportion which may fluctuate between 51% and 80% if the
competent national authority determines that the proportion correctly
reflects the actual management.
A foreign enterprise1 21 is one less than 5% of whose capital is in
the hands of national investors or, if that percentage is higher than
51%, it is not, in the opinion of the national competent authority,
reflected in its management.
Investments are both defined and characterized. Thus a new
investment1 22 is one made after July 1, 1971 in either existing or new
enterprises. Reinvestments 1 23 are investment of all or part of
undistributed profits.
We have already noted the dependista antagonism to foreign
investment. One such conflict involves the power of foreign investors,
especially transnationals, to affect important developmental policy.
Addressing this concern, the Code requires that any foreign investor
wishing to invest in an Andean country submit an application to the
competent national authority (hereinafter CNA). The CNA must then assess
the application with a view toward the country's development policy. It
will be approved if it is deemed consistent with the national
interest.1 24 No member state may approve an investment in an activity
already covered by an existing industry. Moreover, no member state may
approve an investment where the purpose is to acquire shares,
participation or rights owned by national or subregional investors. 125
This latter proviso is clearly meant to redress the practice of foreign
takeover of indigenous firms.
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The CNA is empowered to authorize foreign participation in national
or mixed firms, if the capital of the respective enterprise is increased
and the enterprise at least maintains mixed classification.126
Reinvestments are treated as new investments. As such they trigger
authorization and registration requirements.127 However, the Andean
governments may permit reinvestment of profits - as long as they do not
exceed 7% of the company's capital.128 No authorization is required
for these amounts. However, registration is required.129
Another route around the reinvestment stricture of art. 12 is the
application of undistributed earnings to the acquisition of Portfolio
Development Bonds when reinvested earnings and these bonds do not exceed
7% of the company's capital. Registration is required.130
The CNA must examine and approve all contracts which touch upon
importation of technology, patents or trademarks. It is charged with
appraising the effective contribution of the goods in which the
technology is incorporated, or with applying any other standard it deems
appropriate for measuring the effects of the imported technology.131
Chapter III addresses special regulation by sectors. Each state is
to determine which sectors of economic activity it will reserve for
national public or private enterprises. The State must determine whether
mixed enterprises will be admitted. The Commission, on recommendation of
the Board, may determine the sectors which all states shall reserve for
national or private enterprises and whether participation of mixed
enterprises will be allowed.132
Foreign firms in these special sectors shall not be obligated to
abide by the provisions of Chapter III regarding their transformation
into mixed or national firms. They are subject to the other provisions
and not to articles 40 and 43.133
During the first 20 years of the Code, foreign firms engaged in the
basic products sector (subject to concessions) will not be required to
transform as long as their contracts do not exceed 20 years. 1 4
Depletion tax allowances are not allowed for basic products sector
activity. The preferable form for foreign participation here is a
contract of association with the State.
Upon authorization by the CNA, the owner of a direct foreign
investment shall have the right to transfer abroad, in freely convertible
currency, the verified net profits resulting from the direct foreign
investments but not in excess of 2C% of that investment annually.
However, member countries may authorize greater percentages and shall
communicate to the Commission the provisions or decisions taken in this
respect. The CNA may also authorize the investment of excess distributed
earnings, in which case such investments shall be considered direct
foreign investments.
There are to be no new investments in the public service
sector.135 The only exemptions are those investments made to insure
the technical and economic efficiency of currently existing firms. 136
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The Code proscribes new direct foreign investment in insurance,
commercial banking and other financial institutions. Foreign banks in
existence in member states had three years from the Code's effective date
to cease receiving local deposits in current accounts, savings accounts
or time accounts. Such banks could stay in business if they converted
into national enterprises,13 7 that is, sold 80 of their capital to
national investors within the three year period.
No new direct foreign investment is permitted in domestic
transportation enterprises, advertising enterprises, commercial radio
stations, television stations, newspapers, magazines, or enterprises
engaged in domestic marketing of products of any kind. Foreign firms
already in these sectors must also convert into national enterprises. 138
The sanctions for non-compliance (when a host country does not grant
exemption from these provisions) are that the products shall not enjoy
the advantages of the duty-free program of the Cartagena Agreement.139
The Code requires an investor to register the agreement reached with
the CNA. The agreement must specify the terms of authorization. The
amount of the investment is registered in freely convertible
currency.140
The authority which registers the investment is responsible for
supervising its fulfillment. Among other things, the CNA must supervise
fulfillment of commitments for national participation in the enterprise's
technical, administrative, financial and commercial management and in its
capital structure.141 It must authorize the purchase of shares and
participation of rights of national or mixed enterprises by foreign
investors, as per article 3 and 4.142 The CNA must establish an
information and price control system of the intermediate products that
may be furnished by suppliers of foreign technology or capital. It must
authorize the transfer abroad of all amounts authorized by the Code or by
national law, centralize statistical accounting and supervisory records
connected with direct foreign investments and authorize licensing
contracts for the use of imported technology, trademarks and patents.143
Only national or mixed firms or foreign firms which transform into
national or mixed firms can enjoy the advantages derived from the
duty-free program of the Cartagena Agreement.I 44 In order to avail
itself of the program, a foreign firm must, within three years of the
regime's effective date, register to divest itself. After the three
years there must be national investor participation of not less than
15%. Time periods for fade-out vary, it is 15 years in Columbia, Peru
and Venezuela and 20 years in Bolivia and Ecuador commencing January 1,
1974. The divestment program contemplates that after two-thirds of the
time period, participation of national investors must not be less than
45%.145 Foreign firms established after July 1, 1971 must agree to
place on sale, as per art. 31, a percentage of shares so that they are
transformed as per the above program.14 6
Only firms who indicate (within the three year period) their
willingness to transform, will be granted certificates of origin of
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merchandise by the national authority responsible for it. 14 7 Foreign
firm fade-out agreements must stipulate certain matters.148 During the
period of this transformation foreign firms will enjoy the advantages of
the duty-free program. However, any breach of their agreement
effectively terminates such benefits.14 9 The CNA controls the fade-out
obligations and the manner of sale.1 50 The rights granted by the Code
are the maximum that can be granted,151 though to be sure each state
can impose stricter requirements.
A foreign firm which exports 80% or more of its products into third
countries shall not be obligated to abide by the provisions of the Code.
Of course, it cannot participate in the duty-free program established by
the Agreement. 152 Upon authorization by the CNA, the owners of a
direct foreign investment can transfer abroad, in freely convertible
currency, the verified net profits resulting from the direct foreign
investment, as long as they are not in excess of 20% of that investment
annually. A member state can authorize a greater percentage but most
communicate this to the Commission.15 3
A registered investor can repatriate invested capital when shares are
sold to national or subregional investors or upon reinvestment. However,
sale of shares to another foreign firm must be authorized and will not be
considered for re-exportation of capital.1 54 The Code defines
re-exportable capital as the original investment registered and actually
made plus any reinvestments made in the same enterprise in accordance
with the provisions of the Code minus any net losses.1 55
Upon liquidation, the difference between the real value of the net
assets and the re-exportable capital, as defined above, is considered
capital gains and can be transferred abroad after payment of taxes. 156
After payment of taxes a foreign investor acquires the right to transfer
abroad amounts obtained from the sale of shares or other rights.157
Conversion is to be at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time the
draft is drawn.158
Transfer covering amortization or interest because of the use of
foreign credits shall be authorized as per the registered contracts.
Foreign credit agreements between a parent and its subsidiary may not
have a real rate of interest which exceeds by more than three points the
interest rate of first class securities prevailing in the financial
market of the country of origin of the currency in which the transaction
is registered.1 59 The CNA must determine the real rate of interest for
any other external credit contract. Nevertheless, it must be closely
related to the prevailing conditions of the financial market of the
country in which the transaction has been registered.
The Code closes one large loophole involving profit remittance by
allowing intangible technological contributions the right to payment of
royalties, upon authorization by the CNA. Caveat: they may not be
computed as capital contributions. If furnished to a foreign enterprise
by its parent or an affiliate, however, no payment of royalties shall be
authorized and no deduction is allowed for tax purposes.160
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The Code also addresses importation of foreign technology. Contracts
for the importation of technology must contain clauses identifying terms
of transfer, stating the value assigned in the contract to the various
components of the technology, expressed in a form similar to that
followed in the registration of direct foreign investments.161 Any
contract containing anticompetitive clauses is to be automatically denied
authorization.162 The exception is where the CNA allows limitation of
the product manufactured. In no cases can clauses of this nature be
accepted in connection with subregional trade or exportation of similar
products to third parties.163
CNA's are charged with keeping abreast of the available technology on
the world market in order to have alternative solutions to recommend to
the Board for subregional development. 164 Preference is to be given to
products incorporating indigenous technology. Upon Board recommendation,
the Commission may propose to the member countries the establishment of
charges for products using trademarks of foreign origin for which
royalties have to be paid when generally known or easily accessible
technology can be used in their production.165
The Code charged the Commission with articulating a policy on
subregional technology.166 Such a policy would prohibit the use of
restrictive covenants.167 Lastly, at the Board's proposal, the
Commission may indicate productive processes or groups of products with
respect to which no patent privilege may be granted in any of the member
countries. It may also revise privileges already granted.168
As has already been mentioned, the Code imposes upon member states an
affirmative obligation to follow a set course of conduct. It should come
as no surprise that the system should experience internal dissension. An
instance of such dissension occurred during 1976 with Chile's insistence
on a revision of the Code. The controversy briefly sketched below
illustrates how potential conflicts can come about intraregionally and
how the Code, as already analyzed, came to be. 169
B) Dissension and Modification
Prior to the incorporation of the Code into the Chilean legal order,
the regulation of foreign investment was characterized by absence of a
unified developmental policy. "The preceding legal order sought to
formalize rather than to regulate. The restrictions on foreign
investments aimed at safeguarding the financial integrity of the
transactions rather than at furthering specific development
objectives. "170
Chile was a party to the Agreement of Cartagena when Eduardo Frei was
President. The Code was incorporated through Decree Law 482 of the
Chilean Ministry of Foreign Relations in June of 1971. The decree
established the Code's operating mechanisms and abrogated any
inconsistent law.171 Frei was succeeded by Allende. Allende had
expressed agreement with the Code, however. With the ouster of Allende's
regime in September of 1973 came the realization that the Code could not
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dictate solutions to so many of Chile's grave economic problems then
"accentuated by a world-wide drop in copper."'1 72 The economic needs of
Chilean society were obvious: curtail inflation and accelerate growth.
This was to be accomplished by attracting foreign capital. On July 13,
1974 Chile enacted Decree Law 600.173
The first confrontation with the Andean Group came at the Fifteenth
Ordinary Session of the Cartagena Agreement on September 10-12,
1974,174 at which time member states were to negotiate a tariff-cutting
schedule. "The session ended with the presentation of a joint
declaration by Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador and Venezuela stating that
Chilean D.L. 600 contravened the Cartagena Agreement in its spirit and
philosophy and constituted a parallel regime... which has internationally
generated expectations contrary to the subregional interest."'1 75
The fear was that Chilean D.L. 600176 would create pressure within
the other member states to attract foreign capital and hence hurt the
integration movement. It was also felt that only through a collective
effort could foreign capital be made to respond to regional needs.
Inherent in Chile's stance was the statement that Andean Group
measures are not ipso facto supreme (as the Agreement contemplates). The
Chilean position seemed to be that such measures are national law only to
the extent that they are congruent with national needs.1 77 Or the
Chilean position could have been interpreted to mean that, although
supreme, Andean measures could be departed from when special
circumstances affected the national interest. Both positions would
contravene the purposes of the Agreement.
The Andean members pointed out that D.L. 600 had no fade-out
provision, that the limitation on profit remittances was excluded, that
it did not limit access to credit and that it favored foreign
investors.1 78
Resolution of the problem occurred during the Sixteenth Ordinary
Session of the Cartagena Agreement. D.L. 600 was effectively limited to
articles 34 and 44 of the Code.1 79 However, Chile found that "it could
not eliminate investors' doubts; ... a lack of investor confidence,
exacerbated by uncertainty as to the outcome of the clash with D.24,
transformed the promise of D.L. 600 into an illusion."'180 During the
summer of 1976 Chile intensified its attack on D.24 refusing to approve
revision of the tariff reduction schedule.181 At this point the
member states were willing to meet some of Chile's demands.182 The
member states agreed to a protocol establishing a special commission
between Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela on one hand and
Chile on the other.18 3 The protocol sought a complete resolution of
the crisis. Article 2 of the protocol, however, provided that
if by the completion of the period indicated in the
preceding article (24 days from the protocol's
effective date) an agreement between the parties
should not be reached, then they agree, by virtue of
this agreement, to Chile's withdrawal from the
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Cartagena Agreement, renouncing all its rights and
ending its obligations derived from that Agreement ...
except the rights and obligations emanating from
Decisions 40, 46, 56 and 94 which shall remain fully
in force.184
Chile was adamant, and would not be placated. Hence, at their
Seventh Ordinary Session, the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement
adopted Decision 102, giving effect to the protocol of October 5 and
creating a committee to study how the laws not affected were to be
implemented. 185
Chile's actions had a profound influence on the character of the
Code. During October 30, 1976, the Commission approved reforms to the
Code. Other reforms were approved during November 25 to 30, 1976.186
Taken together the reforms were extensive.
Prior to the reform, investors who had established a one year
residency and renounced repatriation had been considered national
investors.187 Now one or both of these conditions can be waived.
188
The reform also created a new class of investor, the subregional
investor. He enjoys the right to repatriate capital and remit profits
but is considered a national investor for purposes of the Code. For a
foreign investor to be considered a subregional investor he must get
authorization from both the country of origin and the receptor
country. 189 No subregional investments can be authorized for
industries producing products reserved to other member countries.1 90
Another reform opens up medium term credit (three years or less)191
to foreign investors. It also returns to national legislation,
determination of the terms and condition under which
short-and-medium-term credit is to be granted to foreign firms.
192
The Code required a foreign investor wishing to participate in a
national or mixed enterprise to meet two conditions. First, the investor
had to increase the capital of the enterprise and second, it could not
alter the nature of the enterprise invested in. The reform does not
affect the first requirement. As to the second, it requires that the
receptor maintain its quality as a mixed firm. Hence, the investor is
given a wider choice of methods.19 3
The reform also addresses investment of excess profits. The low
percentage limits imposed on these profits created an anomalous
situation: the accumulation of resources belonging to foreign investors
without right of convertibility nor right of repatriation. They fit
neither the definition of direct investment nor national investment
(because of the nationality of the owners). The reform
included a new provision with which governments could
authorize investment of the excess of the annual
profits produced by foreign investment. The norm
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requires that [the subject matter] be profits
distributed to ... investors .... Once authorized as
investment of [excess profit] they are converted to
foreign direct investment with the privileges inherent
to these.194
When the original Code was promulgated, the requirement that foreign
firms fade out was contingent on the agreement entering into force
simultaneously on July 1, 1971. However, Venezuela did not adopt the
Code until 1974, and there were questions as to its constitutionality in
Columbia. The Commission decided to attempt some uniformity as to
transformation by utilizing January 1, 1974 as the date at which
transformations were to begin.195 Further, the reform established the
possibility of realizing this transformation through capital increase of
the enterprise.196 The reform also established that international
financial entities and foreign governmental agencies of developmental
cooperation can qualify their investments as neutral.197
Since Chile's departure from the Andean group, her fortune has been
mixed.198 The other Andean states continue to work under the regime in
one way or another.199 One member state, Venezuela, deserves brief
mention. Venezuela's decision to join the Andean Group was announced by
President Caldera in 1973. This is noteworthy because in the early 60's
the prevalent opinion was that "any common market or free trade area will
leave us producing nothing but petroleum and iron ore, and importing
everything else. Our textiles cannot compete with Brazilian textiles,
our coffee cannot compete with Columbian coffee and our meat cannot
compete with Uruguayan meat."'200 By 1972 the attitude had changed.
"[I]t had become apparent to many of the nation's decisionmakers that
participation in these organizations was essential if Venezuel were to
continue its economic growth and to avoid exclusion from important
trading markets."'201 Venezuela had little difficulty accepting the
underlying philosophy of the Code. By 1971202 Venezuela's national
legislation already incorporated many of the basic concepts of the Code.
By 1974, Venezuela had fulfilled the steps required to bring it into the
Andean fold.203
C) Emerging Antitrust Concepts
During their Sixteenth Extraordinary Session, the Commission of the
Agreement of Cartagena approved Decision 45 addressed to regulation of
competition.204 The decision was taken pursuant to the mandate of
Chapter III of the Agreement imposing a duty to harmonize laws.
Correcting practices that distort competition comes within the mandate
since the liberalization program of the Agreement has as an objective
putting at the disposition of subregional consumers a growing volume of
goods produced within the subregion in conditions of ever more favorable
price and quality.205
The decision establishes per se violations. They are dumping, price
manipulation,206 conduct whose purpose is to influence the normal flow
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of primary materials20 7 and any other (conduct) of equivalent
effect.2 0B8
Any member state which feels aggrieved by the conduct of any other
member state can present its case to the Junta 20 9 together with the
facts giving rise to the claim.21 0 The Junta must communicate with the
member complained about within 48 hours in order to solicit information
on the matter. This information must be returned to the Junta within 15
days. The Junta is empowered to take any measure (conducting a study or
convoking a meeting of the parties) necessary.21 1
If the parties do not arrive at a solution, and the Junta feels there
is sufficient evidence for the adoption of corrective measures, it may
order application of such measures. Such measures are to be adopted
within 30 days of the time (15 days) measured in art. 4, but the Junta is
to expedite the corresponding resolution. 21 2 It then communicates this
to the interested parties, to the other member states and to the
Commission at its next meeting.213 The Decision provides for summary
proceeding for situations wherein time is of the essence.214
In order to carry out the provisions of the Decision, the Junta can
authorize imposition of restrictions and barriers to those products which
are the object of distortion of competition.21 5 The restrictions are
in effect subject to approval by the Commission. If no action is taken
by the Commission at its next meeting, the decision of the Junta is to
remain in effect.216
There is a right of direct review of the Junta's resolution by the
Commission. This right must be exercised within 60 days following the
effective date of the resolution.21 7 If the offending practices
emanate from a country outside the subregion218 and affect products
upon which compromises have been granted, the affected state must solicit
the Junta to apply article 8 restrictions. If not, unilateral action is
permitted,219 as long as the Junta and Commission are notified. When
the Junta determines that the conduct which gave rise to Article 8
restrictions has ceased, it shall communicate this and its actions
lifting the restrictions to the state. 220
The Decision places an affirmative obligation upon the bodies
involved in the Cartagena Agreement to evaluate conduct which causes
distortion in order to enable characterization of practices as per se
offensive or as acceptable within certain parameters.
D) Regime on Multinational Enterprises
Article 28 of the Agreement imposes upon the Andean States (through
the Commission) the task of developing a common regime for the treatment
of sub-regional capital. The Uniform Regime on Multinational Enterprises
and Regulation of Subregional Capital was promulgated by the Commission
in December of 1971 to fulfill this mandate.221
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A subregional investor is defined as the national investor of a
member state distinct from the receptor country.222 The purpose of the
Decision is to encourage investments in a newly created vehicle: the
Multinational Enterprise (hereinafter MNE).223 To this end the
investor obtains authorization from the CNA of the country of origin to
invest in an MNE or to transfer capital to the receptor (host) country.
The CNA can establish a method of profit remittance but may not authorize
repatriation of capital nor transfer of profits to any country other than
to the country of capital origin.224
Further, CNAs cannot authorize acquisition by foreign investors of
shares or rights of subregional investment property. Sale of any shares
or rights to an investor of a different nationality must be authorized by
the CNA of the receptor country.225
A MNE is an enterprise whose business purpose revolves around either
the sectorial programs of industrial development, infra-structure
projects aimed at furthering integration, programs rationalizing the
production of existing industries and joint programs for the development
of agriculture and cattle raising 226 or any other program which the
Commission determines is of subregional importance. Moreover, an MNE may
not allow foreign participation greather than 4C; 227 participation of
national investors of member countries cannot be less than 15% of the
subregional total 228 and subregional capital must be reflected in the
technical, financial and administrative management of the firm. 229 The
capital of an MNE is to be evidenced by denominated shares230 whose
value is to be expressed in the monetary unit of the enterprise's country
of principal domicile.231
The charter of said enterprise must conform to the requirements of
arts. 8 and 9 232 as well as to the requirements of national
legislation.233 The promoters must obtain authorization from the
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement234 certifying compliance with
arts. 8 and 9. Once received, the CNA must forward copies of these
documents to the Junta and to the rest of the member states. 235 Upon a
finding of non-compliance with the prerequisites of article 8, the CNAs
of the office member states may complain to the CNA of the enterprise's
principal domicile.236 This must be done within 60 days of receiving
the documents characterizing the MNE. After said 60 days have expired,
or any questions have been resolved, the CNA of principle domicile is to
conclude the charter.237
The "sweeteners"'238 are found in Chapter VI of the Decision. MNE's
shall enjoy the advantages of the liberalization program.239 They are
entitled to the same treatment as national investors240 in matters
pertaining to state acquisition of their products. Further, they are not
subject to divestment requirements of the Code;241 they have access to
internal credit 242 as national investors and they require no prior
authorization to reinvest profits.243 They are entitled to participate
in the economic activities of the member states reserved for national
enterprises.244 They also have the right to transfer the net (proved)
profits resulting from their direct investment, after the payment of any
taxes and after obtaining authorization from the NCA.245
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Lastly, article 37 establishes that MNE's are to enjoy the benefits
of trade liberalization and relaxed restrictions on transfer of start-up
capital in all the member states. They are entitled to the benefits
granted by articles 30-36, only in the member states whose nationals
participate in capitalization as per art. 11.246
E) Subregional Technological Policy
During their Thirteenth Extraordinary Session which took place
between May 27 and June 5 of 1974, the Commission of the Agreement of
Cartagena adopted Decision No. 84, entitled "Bases for a Subregional
Technological Policy."t247
The decision recognized the enormous role that technology plays in
development248 and undertakes to establish within the subregion the
scientific and technical infra-structure requisite to fulfill the needs
of development.24 9 It imposes upon the member states a common policy
the purpose of which is to promote the application of technical know-how
which will favor subregional development. 50 This must be done with a
view toward equalized development between small and medium states on one
hand and large states on the other.251
The decision requires the member states to take "concrete action"
with regard to various programs of development including evaluation,
selection and control of imported technology,2 2 the simulation,
adaptation and copying of foreign technologies2 53 and obtaining and
diffusing information relating to available technology.254
I
Chapter III addresses importation of technology. It imposes upon the
CNA's of member states a duty to evaluate contracts involving importation
of technology with a view toward determining its effect upon the
subregion. One such effect is the repercussions of such imported
technology on the development of indigenous technology, its contributions
to specific projects of interest to the nation or the subregion and the
effect on the balance of payments.255 Moreover, when the technology
affects the national interest, the decision requires an applicant to come
before the CNA and establish what other sources of technology are
available, their cost and the reasons why he chose the present one. 256
In addition to the information required by the Code,2 57 the CNA may
also request information which would enable it to break down the imported
technology into its various components, in order to determine which
should be obtained locally and which must be imported.2 58 To
effectuate these purposes all member state CNAs are to cooperate25 9 in
investigating sources of technology, and all member states must include
clauses incorporating these requirements (as well as those of Decision
24) into the norms, guides and financing requirements of projects or
studies commissioned by them.260
Chapter IV establishes the methodology by which technology will be
assimilated and developed. It calls upon member states to adopt
mechanisms to increase the capacity to generate technology, i.e. creation
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of incentives to stimulate demand.261 Further, it requires member
states to prefer natural persons, national firms, mixed and multinational
firms when they contract for consulting, engineering or other such
services262 if circumstances permit.263 With regard to those
contracts negotiated with third-party countries, there must be agreement
that the project will provide for the participation of national, mixed or
multinational enterprises.264
The Commission, through recommendation of the Junta, can approve
"Andean Projects of Technological Development." These projects have a
dual purpose: to find solutions to specific problems of common interest
relating to technology or to help develop a policy on how best to
cooperate internationally in technology markets. Two or more member
states can present such a plan to the Junta. The junta must then analyze
and communicate its findings which includes a proposal to effectuate the
plan to the Commission.265
To be acceptable the project proposal must include data such as a
definition of the problem that will be addressed, the objectives of the
project including justification for the particular choice, an estimate of
possible benefits (social and economic), a determination and organization
of the technological and scientific activities necessary for the
execution of the project, the mode through which other member states can
participate and other enumerated matters. 266 Another matter that must
be provided for is a financing plan.267
F) Industrial Property
The Andean Group has also acted to address industrial property. In
June of 1974 during their Thirteenth Extraordinary Session the Commission
adopted Decision 85.268 The decision introduces regulations of
patents, licenses, trademarks and other (intangible) property rights.
Chapter I addresses patents. 269 It provides for the grant of a
patent for new inventions (or improvements on existing inventions) which
have industrial application.270 An invention is not new if it has been
made public via an oral or written description, by its exploitation, or
through any other means sufficient to permit its production prior to
presentation of the application.271
An inadvertent disclosure such as a bad-faith disclosure of the idea
by a colloborator or employee of the inventor (or theft of the idea) does
not constitute publication so as to divest the investor of a right to a
patent. Likewise an inventor will not be deemed to have lost his patent
right when he has exhibited the invention in an exposition recognized by
a member state, or when conducting experiments to determine its
application to industry. 272
Anything that can be manufactured and used in any type of industry is
susceptible of a patent. 273 Excluded are: scientific principles and
scientific discoveries, the discovery of material existing in nature,
commercial, financial and accounting plans, game rules or any other
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system, which are abstract in nature. Esthetic creations and therapeutic
methods for diagnostic treatment of humans or animals are also
excluded.2 74
No patents shall be granted to inventions contrary to public policy.
No patent will be issued for inventions relating to essentially
biological procedures. Also excluded are pharmaceutical or nutritional
products whether for human, animal or vegetable use. No right will
derive from a solicitation on foreign invention if a prior solicitation
has been submitted in another state. 275
Patents can be held by natural or juridical persons. The first to
apply obtains the right except where there are joint applicants, where
each takes in common.276 An inventor whose invention has been stolen
can challenge and get title to the patent during the 90 days following
publication of patent solicitation or he can seek judicial action if the
patent has already been granted.2 77 The opposition proceeding is
commenced by a filing at the national office. It is then forwarded to
the proper jurisdictional body. The applicant must then answer in
accordance with his national rules. There is a two year statute of
limitation for bringing an opposition proceeding. 2 78 Unless otherwise
agreed, an invention produced by an employee under contract shall belong
to his employer.279 A prior patent solicitation in any member state
grants the applicant priority (as of the petition date) in all the member
states.280 All applications are to be made to the national office in
charge.281
Once presented, the patent application is examined by the national
authority to determine whether it meets patentability requirements and
whether the proper documents have been filed.28 2 If the authority
finds non-compliance, it must communicate this to the applicant, who then
has 60 days in which to correct it. If the applicant does not correct
the application within this time, he is deemed to have abandoned the
application. Further, an invention once filed cannot be altered except
as the respective national office shall provide.283
If the invention meets the requirements, it is to be published in a
body of adequate publicity.284 During the next 90 days anyone can
present observations tending to divest the invention of
patentability.2 85 The decision further provides that the applicant may
defend his invention by showing its merit. He has 60 days to do
this.286 Nevertheless, after the period has expired the national
authority is to weigh the patentability 287 and, if it is found to be
meritorious, the patent or an amended patent will be issued.288
Member states can decide to have complete exams conducted upon the
state of art that may affect patentability in specific sectors.2 89 The
national authorities can seek expert opinion to determine the novelties
of the invention.2 90 Member states are to maintain each other and the
Junta fully informed as to granted patents.291 Any invention affecting
national security can be granted subject to restriction.292
Classification and ordering of patents are to conform to the
International Classification of Invention Patents, subscribed 19
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December, 1954. Member states must subscribe to this system within a
year of the decision's effective date. 293
A patent grants its holder the exclusive right to exploit the
invention, to grant licences and to receive royalties or compensation for
allowing third parties to exploit the invention. The patent does not
grant an exclusive right to import the patented product or one produced
by the patented process.294 The monopoly is for a maximum term of ten
years.29 5
Once granted, the patent holder has three years to communicate to the
national authority that he has commenced exploitation.296 The patent
holder must also register any license or assignment or any other
arrangement allowing a third party title to the patent.297
Licenses to third parties must be in writing or they are invalid.
Moreover, they must be registered and approved by the national
authority.298 A patent holder that has not communicated that he has
used the patent (within the three years period) may find that the state
will license someone else. Any one of various statutory evils empowers
an individual to seek compulsory licensing. These include: failure to
use (within three years), suspension of use (for one year), failure of
production to meet national (market) needs, or failure of the patent
holder to grant a license on reasonable terms. Further, after five
years, the national authority can grant the license without finding the
above. The holder of the forced license, however, must pay the patent
holder adequate compensation. 299 Compensation is to be fixed by the
national authority after hearing the parties. A licensee cannot grant
sublicenses without authorization from the patent holder.300
Once a compulsory license is granted, it must be used or the same
statutory evils that allowed its grant can empower its divestiture.301
Any use of a patent without authorization from its holder or the national
authority is subject to fine (in favor of the nation). The patent holder
must pursue whatever remedy is provided by national law.302
The decision also provides for the registration of models and
drawings.3 03 The process provided for parallels the process described
for patents except that there are no provisions made for compulsory
sharing.304
Chapter III addresses trademarks. It provides that service or
trademarks which are distinctive or novel, can be registered 305 by
private or public enterprises, cooperatives or any other grouping of
juridical persons. 306
Any mark contrary to good public order, or which tends to deceive
public consumers or commercial entities, as to the nature, source, mode
of manufacture, characteristics or attributes of the product will be
denied registration.30 7 If the mark is a foreign name or a geographic
name, it shall state at the base of the product, the place of manufacture.
The procedure for obtaining a trademark is (except for subject
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matter) nearly identical to the procedure for obtaining a patent. After
the presentation of a trademark application, the national authority must
examine whether it meets the requirements enumerated by the statute. If
it does not, it must notify the applicant who has 60 days to correct any
fault with the application. Once corrected, the mark issues.
When granted, it is published in a journal to be designated by each
national leqislature. Within 30 days, parties can file an opposition
proceeding. 08 The trademark grants protection in only one class.
Those seeking protection in more than one class must file separate
applications. Classification is as per the international agreement of
Nice, signed June 15, 1957.309 Member states not already signatories
have a year to become so.
Registration grants exclusive right to the mark.310 The mark may
be cancelled if the holder has abused it311 or when the registration
has expired.31 2
G) The Role of Law in Integration
As early as its first periodic meeting, the Andean Pact leaders
recognized the need to establish a body to resolve controversies313
related to the interpretation of the Agreement, Decisions and Resolutions
which emanated from other bodies.314 The Junta commenced work early
and by 1974 had submitted to the respective governments a projected
treaty to establish a Court of Justice. The proposal was discussed in
various meetings315 "and partially modified until a definitive version
was considered in successive reunions of plenipotentiary representatives
convened to negotiate the treaty of the tribunal's creation which took
place in Lima in February and March of 1979.''316
In the context of Andean subregional integration, the very complexity
of the Andean Group mandates a judicial arbiter. The nature of the
Agreement imposes upon the national judicial structure a regional one
which has primacy over the national.
We have already seen that the principal policy instruments are the
Decision (approved by the Commission) and the Resolution (which is the
Junta's mode of judicial expression).
The Decision317 is characterized by its binding nature and its
direct application in the member states. It obligates the member states
to incorporate the decision content into internal law. At this point, a
conceptual distinction must be made between economic collaboration and
economic integration. As Professor Zuldveno and others have noted,
[s]tates participating in a scheme of cooperation seek
methods of convergence through permanent negotiations
.... [T]he institutional route generally is ... an
organ integrated by plenipotentiary delegates ...
whose decisions are taken unanimously and who lacking
unanimity bind only those voting. For [their] part
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integration schemes create organs with appropriate
decision making powers .... [These decisions] are
generally taken by majority and obligate all members,
even those who voted against it.318
This is a factor of international structure building which creates new
relationships between sovereign states. An example is the structure of
the European Economic Community. 319
The institutional system of the Andean Group is similar to that of
the European Communities. 320  It is not surprising that the rationale
and structure of the judicial system should be also. In its proposal,
the Junta addressed three basic considerations: first, that integration
was to be carried out subject to the rules emanating from the structure
of the Agreement and pursuant to an unquestioned application of the
principle of pacta sunt servanda, second, the existence of an organ which
represents national interests and lastly, the overriding concern that
inevitable conflicts do not destroy the community.321
The Treaty 322 creating the Andean Court sets out the juridical
structure of the Agreement to be the Cartagena Agreement, its Protocols
and Additional Instruments, the Treaty establishing the Court, Decisions
of the Commission and Resolutions of the Junta.323 It provides that
Decisions are obligatory on all member states as of the date they are
approved by the Commission.324 They must therefore be incorporated as
internal law.325 The Junta's resolutions enter into force on the date
and under conditions established in the resolutions.326
The Court, designated as one of the principal institutions of the
Cartagena Agreement, 327 is composed of five justices (nationals of the
member countries) who are to be fully independent in the exercise of
their functions.3 28 Justices are to be chosen from lists presented by
each member and selected by unanimous vote of the plenipotentiaries
accredited for the purpose. They serve for six year terms, (they can be
re-elected once) and they are to be partially replaced every three
years. 329 There are to be two designated alternates to replace any
judges who die or are otherwise removed.330  A justice can be removed
upon complaint of the government of a member if, in the exercise of his
function, he has committed any of certain statutory evils. 331 The
Court enjoys the privileges and immunities recognized under international
practices. Justices have the rank of chief of a diplomatic mission.332
The Court may nullify the decisions of the Commission and any
Resolution of the Junta which violate the Agreement's juridical
structures.333 Any natural or juridical person who is affected by a
Decision or Resolution may institute such an action of
nullification.334 There is an estoppel applied to the member states in
that they can bring an action of nullification only when the decision in
question was approved without their affirmative vote.335 Any such
action must be brought within a year of the offending legislation's
effective date. 336 The body whose act is found to violate Cartagena's
norms must take the necessary steps to fulfill the Court's decision. The
treaty allows the Junta to communicate its observation of non-compliance
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to the offending member, who must respond in a manner compatible with the
urgency of the matter, i.e., within a period not to exceed two
months.33 7 If the Junta finds non-compliance and the member state
persists, the Junta is authorized to initiate a proceeding seeking the
Court's decision.338 A member state may initiate the same procedure.
However, if the Junta issues its opinion but does not initiate action
within two months, the complainant may present the matter directly to the
Court. Moreover, if the Junta has not issued an opinion after three
months, then the country can go directly to the Court, 339 which rules
on the controversy. If it finds non-compliance, it will determine to
what extent the aggrieved party may suspend or limit the advantages
deriving from the Agreement.340 Within one year from the date of the
ruling, or within two months of the discovery of any matter which alters
the Court's ruling, the parties may file a petition for a review.341
Natural and juridical persons retain the right to institute suit in the
national forum of the non-complying state. 3 2
The Court may render advisory opinions to national judges who require
an interpretation of anything regarding the juridical structure of the
Agreement, provided that the ruling is appealable within the national
system. In this context, the Court is forbidden to interpret the content
and scope of domestic law or judge the substantive facts of the case.343
The member states must submit any matter occasioned by the Agreement,
or any part of its juridical structure, to the Court. States are
forbidden from applying to any other forum.344 All states are also to
accept the Treaty without reservation.34 5 Lastly, and perhaps most
interestingly, the Treaty provides that it shall remain in effect for as
long as the Cartagena Agreement is in effect. It cannot be denounced
independently. Both the Cartagena Agreement and the Treaty remain in
effect independently of the Treaty of Montevideo.346 It is clear that
the Andean Group hence insured their survival independent of the fall of
the Treaty of Montevideo of 1960.
CONCLUSION
The initial focus of this paper was to be on the legal structure that
controlled foreign investments within the Andean region. It soon became
obvious that an understanding of the black letter law would not do.
Simple truths still apply: a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.
Perhaps in no other areas is the interaction between law and popular
political expression so inextricably connected as in Latin American
investment.
Latin American statesmen have been impelled by more than a desire to
see their countries rise. That is common to all leaders. What
distinguishes them is the way in which they control the fire lighted
under their feet. Popular political expression, what many style the
revolution of rising expectations, has insured that the civilian leader
who cannot get things done (and done quickly) has no political future.
-141-
An analysis of the economic and political factors of underdevelopment
has convinced many that the international economy with its
(predominantly) American character have made Latin states into economic
appendages. The response has varied but has everywhere been sparked by
popular sentiment.
To the more belligerent states the response was clear--expropriate.
Uncertain legal concepts, the sensitivity of foreign relations and State
Department response to such expropriations have largely convinced our
courts that they are not equipped to address the problem.
Some social scientists have sought to understand expropriation (and
hence understand the future) by developing institutional models. One
such model posits that military education, usually superior to the
civilian education Latin leaders may have received, has created an
expanded concept of national security. The enemy is no longer limited to
soldiers on the field. The enemy is anything or anyone who gives
legitimacy to the political subversives within the nation. The oft-
repeated charge that the national future was in the hands of foreigners
falls squarely within the expanded concept of national security.
To be sure, neither theory excludes the other. Taken together one
thing was clear--if foreign investments were to be secure within Latin
states, some sort of structure would have to develop to assuage popular
expression and yet maintain much needed foreign investments. Such a
structure was created with the passage of Decision 24 regulating the form
and extent of foreign participation in development. Born of compromise,
the Decision embodies both the benefits and drawbacks of such an approach.
Such drawbacks were evident in Chile's withdrawal from the
Agreement. Inherent in such a move was the statement that those who need
must accept; they cannot impose obligations on the providers. Inherent
in Venezuela's entry is a statement of the potential benefits.
As research continued it became evident that Decision 24 was only the
first of a series of laws aimed at subjecting the foreign investor to the
will of the state.
Among the principal targets of dependency theorists were the
restrictive clauses foreigners employed and the ramifications of such
clauses on national development. Decision 45 extends the mandate in 24
in this regard; it establishes the basic norms regulating competition.
Decision 46 provides a regime to control subregional capital. It also
creates the multinational firm. Such a firm, promoted and owned by
nationals of the Andean states (with limited foreign participation
allowed), would serve as the vehicle with which to address specific
development tasks. Decision 84 addresses the formulation of a
subregional technology policy. Decision 85 establishes a regime
regulating patents, trademarks, licenses and royalties and hence
addresses the last aspect of Decision 24's mandate.
The shape this structure may take, and hence the opportunity that-may
be created for a mutual growth, is apparent in the strides the Andean
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Group has made. These include the creation of a Court of Jstice to be
the final arbiter of disputes. The Court is specifically empowered to
address the legality of the Commission's Decisions.
To be sure this study cannot claim to be exhaustive of any of the
areas it has addressed. Rather, the aim was to understand the laws
regulating the various aspects of investment in a foreign climate, albeit
this is affected by the political and economic underpinnings of the law.
As the Andean Court grows in stature, it is to be expected that the
community interest will be more clearly defined and perhaps the Decisions
herein analyzed will be reassessed. Meanwhile, the foreign investor has
a choice of vehicles he can utilize to participate in the benefits of
duty-free trade. Moreover, for the first time in decades he has a
guarantee that his property will not be taken as long as he plays by the
rules.
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FOOTNOTES
All translations are by the author. The article published here is
excerpted from 2 Dick. Int. L. Ann. 1 (1983) which contained a
fuller treatment of expropriation and of the regional integration
effort in Latin America.
1. The relationship between economic change and social unrest has
provided political theorists with fertile grounds for thought.
See, e.g., L. Welsch, Political Modernization (1976); j. Eye,
Aspects of Political Development (1966); S. Huntington, Political
Order in Chanaing Societies (1968); C. Johnson, Revolutionary
Change (1960); L. Welch & M. Taintor, Revolution and Political
Change (1972); ,. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (1970).
2. See, e.o., L. Taylor & !j. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and
Social Indicators, ch. 3 (1975). The spirit of this
transformation is illustrated in a speech made by Fidel Castro
entitled History Will Absolve Me. "The demagogues and professional
politicians [deceive].. .everyone about everything... [T]he people we
counted on in our struggle were .... five hundred thousand farm
laborers inhabiting miserable shacks, who work four months of the
year and starve for the rest of the year, sharing their misery with
their children .... " reprinted in B. Mazlish, A. Kaledin & D.
Ralston. Revolution, A Reader 381 71971). -
3. This led to the perception that the problem lay in the structure of
the international economic order. See, e.q., 1. Cockcroft, A
Frank & 0. Johnson, Deoendence and Underdeyelopment: Latin
America's Political Economy (1972). See also. H. Maadoff, The Age
of Imperialism (1969). Indeed, the perception forms the basis for
modern political dialogue. See, e.q., Final Report, Latin American
seminar on the New International Economic Order held June 2-6, 1980
in Havana under the auspices of the University of the United
Nations.
4. Guerrero, El Regimen commun de la inversion extranjera en el Grup
Andino in 8 Derecho de la Integracion 8, 10 (1977). "We ...
reaffirm ... our ... Iconvictioni regarding the plain sovereign
rights of nations to freely dispose of their natural resources
It shall be ... [our] policy to give preference in economic
development of the subregion to capital and enterprises which are
authentically national .... " Id.
5. Id. "The investment of capital and the transfer of foreign
technology are necessary contributions for the development of our
countries and should receive assurance of stability in accordance
with the extent to which they constitute positive contri-
butions .... " Id. Your author uses the phrase "legal structure"
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to define a system in which rights, duties and obligations are
Clearly defined. To the investor, this would mean erection of a
safe harbor since adherence to these rules would preclude (indeed
render unjustified) acts of expropriation.
6. Saavedra, El regimen uniforme de la empresa multi-nacional en el
Grupo Andino, 11 Derecho de la Integrac6n, 11, 18 (1972).
7. See, e.g., K. Fann & D. Hodqe, Readings in U.S. Imperialism
(1971). See also note 3 supra.
8. For a brief outline of major concerns of dependency theorists, see
Jova, Private Investment in Latin America, Renegotiating the
Bargain, 10 Tex. J. Int'l L., 495 (1975).
9. Grunwald, Foreign Private Investment. The Challenge of Latin
American Nationalism, 11 Va. J. Int'l L., 228, 230 (1971).
10. The phrase Andean Pact, Andean nations or Andean region, refers
collectively to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
11. See generally the works of Hirschman, The Political Economy of
Import Substituting Industrialization in Latin America, 82 Q. Econ.
(Feb. 1968). See also U. N. ECLA, The Process of IndustriaT -
Development in Latin America, U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/716/Rev. 1 (1966).
For a discussion of the sequence of economic development see
Chenery, Patterns of Industrial Growth, 50 Am. Econ. Rev.--24
(1960).
12. Guerrero, supra, note 4 at 12.
13. Figures are from M. Wionczek, El Grupo Andino v. La Inversion
extranjera (1970), cited in Guerrero, supra note 4 at 12.
14. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text infra.
15. Guerrero, supra note 4 at 12.
16. These practices severely handicapped the development of indigenous
enterprises.
17. Guerrero, supra note 4, at 13, 16.
18. For an interesting account of corporate (international) misconduct,
see A. Sampson, The Sovereign State of I.T.T. (1973). "While
I.T.T. was so passionately devoting itself to blocking and bringing
down a Marxist government in Chile, it was at the very same time
negotiating with the communists in Moscow to open up the huge
potential new market as the Cold War thawed.... " Id. at 294.
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19. See, e.a., 1. Barnet & R. Muller, Global Reach The Power of the
Multi-national Corporations 123-210 (1974). The disruptive
aspects of corporate activity is the subject of United Nations
efforts under the auspices of the Transnational Corporation
Center. At this writing a draft has been completed. See, e.g.,
Rutledge, United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnationals -- The
Mask of Law Hiding the Deceit of Politics, 6 Dick. Int'l Trade Ann.
269 (1978-79) (unpublished intramural law review).
20. Although a policy of enlightened self-interest would indicate the
contrary. See a. Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776).
21. Guerrero, supra note 4 at 17 (citing a study conducted by the
Chilean Corporation for Development, Comportamiento de las
principales empresas industriales extranjeras acogidas al DFL 258
Santiago de Chile (1970). DFL 280 is the statute which regulates
investment.
22. Guerrero, supra note 4, at 18.
23. Guerrero, supra note 4, (citing a study by Constantino v. Vaitsos
for Departamiento Nacional de Planeacion, Columbia).
24. Guerrero, supra note 4 at 20.
25. Id.
26. Certainly questions of the extraterritorial effect of U.S.
antitrust laws abound. In context of a post World War Two Andean
World the point being made differs. Political response bespeaks
perceptions. The perception generated by economic relations
between these states and the developed world was a study of
contrasts. On one hand omnipotence, technological and otherwise,
on the other perceived impotence. In bilateral transfer of
technology negotiations, Andean nations felt obliged to accept what
we would term contracts of adhesion. Taken alone North American
concepts of arms length negotiations cause conceptual difficulties
in accepting this perception of Andean impotence. In the light of
the politics of the day, conceptual difficulties are clarified.
See, e.g., Comment, Sherman Act Litigation: A Modern Generic
Approach to Objective Territorial Jurisdiction And The Act of State
Doctrine, 84 Dick. L. Rev. 645 (1980).
27. Guerrero, supra note 4, at 21.
28. See, note 1, supra.
29. Mexico - land seizures in 1915; Bolivia - Standard Oil 1936; Mexico
- nationalization of all Petroleum properties and rights 1938;
Argentina (Peron) - confiscation of the major American and Foreign
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Power Subsidiaries 1943-1946; Bolivia - tin mines 1952; Guatamela -
United Fruit Company 1963; Argentina - expropriation of another
American and Foreign Power affiliate 1958; Brazil - 1959; Venezuela
- Sulphur Corporation properties and revocation of concessions;
these are some of the major cases. Eder, Expropriation:
Hickenlooper and Hereafter, 4 Int'l Law, 611-12 (1970).
30. Even the motivation behind the Foreign Aid program became suspect.
See, e-Q., 2. Weissman, The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at
Foreiqn Aid (1975).
31. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
"Expropriations take place for a variety of reasons, political and
ideological as well as economic .... If the political branches are
unwilling to exercise their ample powers to effect compensation,
this reflects a judgment of the national interest which the
judiciary would be ill-advised to undermine indirectly." Id. at
435-36.
32. It was quite clear that the Executive would not send in the Marines.
33. 74 Stat. 330.
34. The President exercised the power by Proclamation No. 3355, 25 Fed.
Reg. 6414 (1960).
35. "Whereas the attitude assumed by the government and legislative
Power of the United States of North America, which constitutes an
aggression for political purposes, against the basic interest of
the Cuban economy, as recently evidenced by the Amendment to the
Sugar Act just enacted ... forces the Revolutionary Government to
adopt ... all and whatever measures it may deem appropriate ... for
the due defense of the national sovereignty and protection of our
economic development process ... whereas, it is advisable ... to
confer upon the President and Prime Minister full authority to
carry out the nationalization of the enterprises and property owned
by physical and corporate persons, who are nationals of the United
States of North America .... " As translated in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401, n.3 (1964).
36. Banco Para El Commercio Exterior.
37. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 407 (1964).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 821.
41. Id.
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42. Id.
43. Id. at 819.
44. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2), Supp. V.
(1970). The Hickenlooper amendment states:
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
court in the United States shall decline on the ground
of the federal act of state doctrine to make a
determination on the merits giving effect to the
principles of international law in a case in which a
claim of title or other right to property is asserted
by any party including a foreign state (or a party
claiming through such state) based upon (or traced
through) a confiscation or other taking after January
1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of
principles, of international law, including the
principles of compensation and the other standards set
out in this subsection: Provided, That this
subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case
in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to
international law or with respect to a claim of title
or other right to property acquired pursuant to an
irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days
duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the
confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with
respect to which the President determines that
application of the act of state doctrine is required
in that particular case by the foreign policy
interests of the United States and a suggestion to
this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with
the court.
45. See French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y. 2d 46 (1968) and
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 431
F. 2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970). French involved Cuban suspension of
convertability of certain certificates of tax exemption owned by an
American. In deciding whether such suspension was a "faking" the
court had to address the effect of the Hickenlooger Amendment on
the Sabbatino decision. The key was construction of the term
"property" (See supra note 44). The court held that the term
referred to tangible personal property. Since the claimant had no
right to a specific fund of dollars - no "taking" had occurred.
The court concluded that the Amendment was addressed to the kind of
problem exemplified by Sabbatino, "a claim or title or other right
to specific property which has been expropriated abroad." In First
National, First National City Bank of New York [hereinafter City]
contended that Cuban expropriation of its property abroad justified
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its retention of a substantial excess after sale of collateral
posted with city as security for laws made to the Cuban Banco
Nacional. Denying the contention, the court narrowly construed the
congressional intent behind Hickenlooper, saying:
Congressman Gross ... urged that the Amendment be
broadened to enable the owner of expropriated property
to seize Cuban assets in the United States as an
offset for the value of property seized by Cuba ....
However, First National City has cited no legislative
history and we have found none, which indicates that
Mr. Gross's suggestion was thought to have been
adopted by Congress when it reenacted the Hickenlooper
Amendment.
Id. at 402.
46. See note 31, at 823.
47. The court in First National took note of Congressional policy
inherent in Subchapter V of the International Claims Settlement Act
of 1949, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643-1643k (1970 Supp.) in which Congress
provided for "the determination of the amount and validity of
claims against the Government of Cuba ... arising out of
nationalization, expropriation intervention, or other takings of
property of nationals of the U.S." The Court also took note of
the fact that Congress and the Executive had acted pursuant to the
Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 5 (1970 Supp.) Proc.
3447, 22 Fed. Reg. 1085, 3 C.P.R. (1959-63) to block all Cuban
assets present in the U.S. but had not provided for vesting of the
blocked Cuban assets. Id. at 403.
48. For instance: Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law. Section
185 ... taking is wrongful under International Law ... when
(a) it is not for a public purpose, (b) there is not reasonable
provision for the determination and payment of just compensation
... under the law and practice of the state in effect at the time
of taking ....
Comment b. [Tihere is little authority in
international law establishing any useful criteria by
which a state's own determination of public purpose
can be questioned .... The concept ... originating in
municipal law systems may have had a reasonably
definite meaning in international law when municipal
systems ... were based on private ownership of the
means of production. However, in view of the
increasingly broad area of governmental activity in
nearly all states, the concept of public purpose ...
seems increasingly vague and of doubtful usefulness in
the future.
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Comment c. It is often stated that the taking of an
alien's property is a violation of international law
unless the state pays just compensation. Since
payment is frequently delayed until sometime after the
taking this would suggest that the legality of the
taking may be determined ab initio by subsequent
events ... The subsequent determination could present
serious problems to third parties (which treat a
taking as in ineffective in passing title) ... The
rule stated ... treats a taking as unlawful on the
ground of failure to pay just compensation only if it
does not appear at the time of the taking that just
compensation will be provided ....
49. See, e.g., Futuovros, International Law and the Third World, 50 Va.
L. Rev. 783, 807-08 (1964). The consistency of this viewpoint can
be gauged by the interchange between the then Mexican Minister for
Foreign Affairs in Washington to then Secretary of State Hull
regarding expropriation of land belonging to U.S. Citizens in
Mexico in 1927.
Hull, The taking of property without compensation is not
expropriation. It is confiscation .... If it were permissible for
a government to take the private property of the citizens of other
countries and pay for it as and when, in the judgment of that
government, its economic circumstances and its local legislation
may perhaps permit, the safeguards which ... established
international law has sought to provide would be illusory ....
Reply, Without attempting to refute the point of view of the
American Government, I wish to draw your attention ... to the fact
that agrarian reform is ... one of the aspects of a program of
social betterment [within a government's ambit] .... [T]here does
not exist in international law any principle universally accepted
by the countries, nor by the writers of treatises on this subject,
that would render obligatory the giving of adequate compensation
for expropriations of a general and impersonal character.
Nevertheless, Mexico admits, in obedience to her own laws, that she
is indeed under an obligation to indemnify ... but [as] she
maintains ... based on the most authoritative ... writers .... on
international law ... that time and manner of such payments must be
determined by her own laws.
3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 656-68 (1942).
50. See Eder, supra note 29, at 617. For a discussion of the various
legal mechanisms available to protect against expropriation in the
original contract see, Wesley, Expropriation Challenge in Latin
America: Prospects for Accord on Standards and Procedures, 46 Tul.
L. Rev. 232, 254-91 (1971).
51. See notes 3 and 8, supra.
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52. Bolivia: Nationalization of Bolivia Gulf, Oct. 17, 1969. 8 Int'l
Lea. Mat. 1663 (1969). After arduous negotiations, a compensaf o-
arrangement was finally arrived at on September 10, 1970. The
government agreed to pay $78,622,171 to be tendered in installments
over a 20 year period beginning in 1973. Wesley, supra'note 50, at
233, 238-40.
53. See Wesley supra note 50, at 243.
54. See 9 Int'l Lea, Mat. 921 (1970). For the Peruvian dealings with
the International Petroleum Company and International Telephone and
Telegraph see 7 Int'l Lea, Mat. 1201 (1968); 8 Int'l Lea. Mat. 765
(1969); 9 Int'l Leg, Mat. 80, 186 (1970).
55. Einaudi, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing
Military Perspective in Peru and Brazil (1971), Rand. 1, 12.
General Cavero then director of CAEM (the Peruvian Center for
Higher Military Studies) spoke at a time when relations with the
United States had improved from a low ebb in early 1969 when
(application of the Hickenlooper Amendment seemed imminent,*
threatening to cut U.S. economic assistance and sugar quotas in
response to the I.P.C. nationalizing); "The threat has varied over
time. At first it was narrowly military in nature. Then new and
subtler psychological and ideological threats arose against the
security of each country. Today we face a new threat: economic
aggression ... we are now fighting against economic aggression."
Einaudi at 30-31. See also1. Nicoll, Peru's Institutional
Revolution (1973) and A. Lowenthal, The Peruvian Experiment (1975).
56. See generally U.N. ECLA, The Process of Industrial Development in
Latin America U.N. Doc. E/CN. 12/716/Rev. 1, 1966. For a
discussion of the usual sequence of industrial development see
Chenery, Patterns of Industrial Growth, vol. #50 Am. Econ. Rev.
(Sept. 1960).
57. Johnson, The Montevideo Treaty for a Latin American Free Trade
Area, 1965 U. Ill. L.F. 715.
58. See note 11, supra.
59. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Trade Expansion and
Economic Integration Among Developing Countries, TD/B/85 Rev. 1
(1966).
60. Indeed if Latin American "demand for steel over the next ten years
were satisfied in the framework of a regionally integrated market
... investment capital amounting to $3.7 billion could be saved."
Id. at 7. See also B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration
120-43 (196. .
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61. Early studies conducted by the U.N.'s Economic Council on Latin
America concluded that the main obstacle to the creation of a free
trade area would be the region's internal customs structure. These
include: tariffs, quotas, import regimes, exchange surcharges,
taxes on remittance of funds, consular fees, prior deposit
requirement and direct controls such as license requirements and
exchange quotas. See U.N. ECLA, U.N. Doc. E/CN.12 1554 (1961).
62. See note 59, supra, at 10.
63. S. Dell, The Early Years of LAFTA's Experience, Michael Wionczek,
Ted=.7,Latin American Economic Intearation: Experience and
Prospects 107 (1966). See also Dell, Trade Blocs and Common
markets (1963).
64. R. Blouoh & J. Bochman, Problems of Regional Integration in Latin
America 18-23 (T968). Space constraints have not permitted full
exposition of integration efforts in Latin America. Rather the
focus here is on the creation of the subregional entity known as
the Andean Pact. The Pact derives its juridical personality from
the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). For a full
treatment of LAIA and its predecessor, the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA) see this writer's treatment in 2 Dick.
Int'l L. Ann. 1 (1983). See also Treaty of Montevideo, Feb. 18,
1960 Multilateral Un. Doc. E/CN/621 (1962) creating LAFTA and 20
Int'l Leg. Mat. 672 (1981) creating LAIA.
65. This arrangement is subject to abuse. It may be profitable to move
goods from outside the region into the free trade area through the
country having the lowest tariff. This defeats the protectionist
(and revenue producing) effects of higher tariff countries.
Solution of this abuse lies in strict enforcement of "rules of
origin" subjecting violators to estoppel.
66. Ereli, The Andean Common Market, 8 Hous. L. Rev. 487, 489 (1971).
67. Andean, 5 Derecho de la Intearacion 117 (1968).
68. See note 59 supra, ch. IV 20.
69. Id. The study indicates that some measures include: (1) letting
smaller-lesser developed countries (S.L.D.C.s) keep their barriers
up longer, (2) exemption for S.L.D.C.s from requirement of higher
customs duty, (3) granting S.L.D.C. preferential access to
markets, (4) creation of fiscal incentives and state aids to
enterprises settling in the less advanced countries, (5) freeing
the movement of persons and (6) priority to improving their
infra-structure. See id. at 23-25. See also B. I. Watsons,
Function of Fiscal Incentives in Modifying the Imbalance in the
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Distribution of Costs and Benefits in the Regional Integration
Efforts of Developing Countries in Actual Problems of Economic
Integration, UNCTAD Pt. TD/B/517, at 18.
70. Santos, El Problema de la desigualidades en la integracion 22-23
Derecho de la Integracibn 14, 16 (1976). The Author's comments
deserve full exposition. "Classical theorists of international
commerce maintain that any interference in the free and spontaneous
forces of the market causes perturbance and is the font of
inefficiency .... This utopian vision only served to assure that
the big fish would eat the small ... that the countries on the
underdeveloped periphery would provide the industrialized center
with cheap primary goods in exchange for costly manufacture ....
Calvin would rejoice from his grave seeing that the moral of (the)
fable has such ideal application in the world."
71. Latin American Common Market: Declaration of Presidents of O.A.S.
Member States--Signed at Punta Del Este, Uruguay, April 14, 1967, 6
Int'l Lea. Mat., 535 (1967).
Before this meeting Colombia had called a meeting of the Presidents
of Chile, Venezuela and presidential representatives from Bolivia,
Ecuador and Peru to discuss their common position in view of the
forthcoming meeting of the Presidents, already referred to. At
this meeting the Presidents agreed to establish an Andean
Development Corporation and closer economic ties. (So-called
Bogota Declaration).
The Corporation, whose purpose is to foster subregional integration
by identifying investment opportunities and participating in them,
has an authorized capital of $100 million. Payment of subscribed
capital is to be in five annual installments. The first
installment was to be in U.S. currency. The remaining; half in
American and half in national currency, provided that full
convertibility be maintained. The agreement was signed on 2/7/68
an has been in effect since January 30, 1970.
72. Id. at ch. l(a)(b), at 537. Hostilities between El Salvador and
Honduras starting in 1969 halted the operation of the Central
American Common Market Organizations .... LAFTA ... could not
reach agreement on how to proceed from a free trade area to a
common market and twice decided to postpone the decision. From
Ereli, supra note 66, at 487.
73. See supra note 71, at 537.
74. Id. at ch. l(2)(d).
75. Resolution 202 CCM-II (VI-E) Norms of Subregional Agreements, Sept.
2, 1967, 2 Derecho de la Integracion 161 (1968).
76. The Resolution states ten such principles--which can be summarized
as follows: (1) Can be by two or more parties, (2) shall
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establish the terms of their commercial policy regarding trade
liberalization (§ 3 must be general--that is, not restricted to
specific sectors) and external tariff policy, (4) must take into
account the subscribers obligations to LAFTA, (5) complementation
agreements must conform to the principals set out in the Treaty of
Montevideo, (6) shall be transitory, establishing effective date
and duration, (7) the Executive organization shall be designated
by the participants, (8) approval of Contracting Parties is
required--the Conference shall analyze the agreements annual
Progress.
77. Resolucion 203 CCM-II (VI-E) 2 Sep. 1967, 2 Derecho de la
Intearacion 162 (1968). Pages 162-165 of the Resolution annexed
the bases of the agreement.
78. Resolucion 222 (VII) of 17 Dec. 1967, 2 Derecho de la Inteqracion
165 (1968). The resolution incorporated the guides discussed in
Resolucion 202 (note 76 supra) as affirmative obligations and added
several more to effectuate them (dividing tasks to specific LAFTA
organizations). Some of the provisions deserve mention here: Art.
13--Any contracting parties proposing the creation of a subregional
agreement shall communicate same to the Committee by their
representative accompanied by information supporting the request.
The Committee shall communicate this to the rest of the contracting
parties. Art. 14--In order to accomplish Art. 13 the Contracting
Parties will elevate the text of their agreement to the Permanent
Executive Committee. Art. 15--All subregional agreements require,
to be effective, the approval of the Permanent Executive Committee
which shall resolve with an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds
of the contracting parties. The Committee should meet no later
than 30 days after being presented with the subregional agreement.
79. See Qenerally G. Amador, Andean Legal Order ch. II (1978).
80. Compatibility of Subregional Agreements with the Treaty of
Montevideo, 2 Derecho de la Inteqraci6n 170 (1968). Former
President Edwardo Frei of Chile requested in 1964 a study of the
issue of integration, (how it could be more rapidly achieved). The
study's recommendations were later to be incorporated into the
Cartagena Agreement. See Haccia la integracion acelerada de
America Latina (Toward accelerated development of Latin America)
Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica (1965).
81. Art. 54 of the Treaty of Montevideo, see note 64, supra.
82. Compatibility of Subregional Agreements with the Treaty of
Montevideo, 2 Derecho de la Inteqracion 171 n. 60. See also
Derecho de la Intearaci6n 118 (1970) - (A question and answer
transcript of sessions between the representatives of the Permanent
Executive Committee and the Mixed Commission of the Andean Group.
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83. Acuerdo de Cartagena (Agreement of Cartagena) 5 Derecho de la
Inteqracin (1969). The members are Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Peru and Venezuela.
84. Id. at art. 5.
85. Id. at art. 6.
86. Id. at art. 7.
87. Id. at art. 10.
88. Supra note 83, at art. 13. The Junta's members appear to serve
contemporary 3 year terms, not staggard terms.
89. Id. at art. 15.
90. Id. at art. 16.
91. Id. at art. 25.
92. Id. at art. 26.
93. Id. at art. 26(d), 27.
94. Supra note 83, at art. 28.
95. Art. 75, ch. VIII, LAFTA, through Resolution 65 (II) of the
Conference of Contracting Parties had already created norms
governing competition.
96. See arts. 8, 11, 12, 25, 26 and ch. VIII, art. 28 and art. 78-81 of
the Agreement.
97. Art. 42.
98. Art. 43.
99. Art. 45.
100. Art. 46.
101. Art. 47.
102. Art. 49. "The Andean Pact continues to make impressive strides.
The automotive industry is a success story. By 1985 the regional
demand for vehicles will surpass $10 billion. The market, moreover
is well protected by the common, external and other advantages
inherent in the auto sectorial program." Fernandez, Latin American
Economic Integration, II Law Am. 152 (1979).
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The Commission's automotive initiative estalishes a
compensated exchange of parts. Under the system,
companies will be able to import components duty free
from other Ancom members or third country, provided
they export an equivalent value outside the bloc.
However, they will not be permitted to import products
that have been allocated to any member country under
the sectoral programs .... The program meshes
perfectly with General Motors plan to export at least
100,000 automotive transmission from Venezuela, and a
similar number of manual transmissions from Ecuador to
countries outside the Andean region.
Andean Group Enacts Autoparts Import Scheme: Regional Court
Planned, 1978 Bus. Latin Am. 366 (A discussion of the Andean court
is included infra).
The Group has addressed itself to liberalizing products on the
sectoral lists and has continued to study various proposals
relating to infra-structure. A recently completed study proposes
development of an Andean Highway System. The system will
ultimately link all five Andean countries. Fernandez, supra at 153.
103. See note 83, supra.
104. See note 83, supra.
105. References to the Code are to 16 Int'l Lea. Mat. 138,(1977).
106. Estimates from Schliesser, Restrictions on Foreign Investment in
the Andean Common Market, 5 Int'l L. 586 (1971).
107. See note 71 supra.
108. See note 105 supra at 2 under General principles.
109. See note 105 supra, at 1 under General Principles. Reference will
be made to a national competent authority. This is the body (in
each member state) charged with implementing the provisos of the
Code within their territory.
110. See note 105 supra, at art. 3.
111. Id. at art. 5.
112. Id. at art. 6.
113. Id. at art. 7.
114. Id. at art. l(a).
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115. See Annex 1-II(b) in the Code.
116. See note 105supra at l(b).
117. Id. at art. l(c).
118. Id. at art. l(d).
119. Id. at art. l(e).
120. Id. at art. l(f). The Commission of the Cartagena Agreement
through Decision 110 was to decide the treatment which was to be
accorded investments of mixed enterprises
121. Id. at art. l(g).
122. Id. at art. 1(h).
123. Id. at art. 1(i). Art. 1(j) added to the Code via art. 33 of
Decision 70. See 12 Int'l Lea. Mat., 349 (1973).
124. See note 105 supra, at art. 2. See Appendix II -- a list of
information required for the assessment.
125. Id. at art. 3.
126. Id. at art. 4.
127. Id. at art. 12.
128. The amount was upped from 5% to 7% after Chile's uproar. See
discussion infra.
129. See note 105 supra, at art. 12.
130. Id. at art. 1(j), added to the Code via art. 33 of Decision 70.
ee 12 Int'l Lea. Mat., 349 (1973). It is defined as a title or
obligation issued for developmental purposes and publicly offered
by the state, a state entity, quasi state entities, national or
mixed firms or by the Andean Development Corporation.
131. See note 105 supra, at art. 18.
132. Id. at ch. III, art. 38.
133. Id. at art. 39.
134. Id. at art. 40. The basic products sector is defined as
exploration and exploitation of any minerals, including liquid and
gaseous hydrocarbons, gas pipelines, oil pipelines and forestry.
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For Bolivia and Ecuador the sector also includes primary
agriculture and livestock.
135. Defined as drinking water, sewers, electric power and lighting,
cleaning and sanitary, telephone, postal and telecommunications
services.
136. See note 105 supra, at art. 41.
137. Id. at art. 42.
138. Id. at art. 43.
139. Id. at art. 44.
140. Id. at art. 5.
141. The purpose of the stricture is to assure the host government that
a minority foreign shareholder of fragmented body shall not control
the enterprise.
142. See notes 53 and 54 supra.
143. See note 105 supra, at art. 6.
144. Id. at art. 27.
145. Id. at art. 28.
146. Id. at art. 30. In the case of Colombia and Peru the agreement
must stipulate participation by national investors in the following
percentages. Fifteen percent at beginning of production, 30% upon
completion of 1/3 of time period, no less than 45% after 2/3. In
the case of Bolivia and Ecuador -- 5%, three years after production
begins; no less than 10% upon completion of 1/3, and no less than
35% after 2/3. In all cases excepting Ecuador and Bolivia, the 20
year period commences two years after production begins.
147. Id. at art. 29--the certificates, by specifying that the firm is a
participant in the Andean Group, acts as a license exempting the
products from payment of duties.
148. Id. at art. 31-- (1) time period for compliance, (2) scale for
transfer of shares participation, or rights to national investors,
(3) registration to insure national investor participation in the
technical, financial, commercial and administrative management of
the enterprise, at least as of the date on which the enterprise
begins production and (4) a method of determining the value of
shares or rights at the time of their sale and a system to insure
the transfer of shares.
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149. Id. at art. 32.
150. Id. at art. 35--see also art. 36. As long as the State has a
determining voice in decision making, an enterprise can be styled,
mixed even if less than 51% capital is national. The Commission or
Board recommendation must establish minimum percentage of
participation of the State or State enterprises within three months
after the regime's effective date.
151. Id. at art. 33.
152. Id. at art. 34.
153. Id. at art. 37.
154. Id. at art. 7.
155. Id. at art. 8.
156. Id. at art. 9.
157. Id. at art. 10.
158. Id. at art. 11.
159. Real rate of interest is defined as the total that must be paid by
the debtor for the use of the credit--including commissions and
expenses of any kind.
160. Id. at art. 21.
161. Id. at art. 19.
162. Id. at art. 20. These include, inter alia, clauses (1) tying the
technology to permanent use of particular personnel, raw materials,
products or other (specific source) technology, (2) fixing prices
of finished product, (c) restricting volume and structure of
production, (d) prohibiting use of competing technology, (e)
obligating purchaser to transfer improvements to supplier, and
(f) "clauses of similar effect."
163. Id.
164. Id. at art. 22.
165. Id. at art. 24.
166. This has been implemented as Decision 84 and is addressed in detail
infra.
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167. See note 105 supra, at art. 25., i.e., prohibition or limitation on
th exportation or sale in certain countries of products
manufactured under the trademark concerned, tying arrangements,
price fixing, etc. Patents are also addressed. See note infra.
168. See note 105 supra, at art. 26. Article 54 requires member states
to establish a subregional Industrial Property Office which shall,
inter alia, (a) serve as liaison between the different national
industrial property office, (b) compile information on industrial
property and distribute it to national offices and (c) prepare
model licensing contracts for the use of trademark and patents in
the subregion. Art. 55 states that upon the recommendation of the
Board, the Commission shall establish a subregional system for the
development, promotion, production and adaptation of technology
.... As to the Code see generally Valdez, The Andean Foreign
Investment Code, An Analysis, J. Int'l L. Econ. 1 (1972); Fouts,
The Andean Foreign Investment Code, i0 ex. Int'l L.J. 537 (1975);
Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Regime tor Foreign Investments,
5 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 313 (1972); Darino, The Andean Code After
Five Years, 8 Law. Am. 635 (1976).
169. It should be re-emphasized that the analysis of the Code just
presented proceeded from a text incorporating the modifications
instigated by Chile.
170. Comment, Chile's Rejection of the Andean Common Market Regulation
of Foreign Investment, 16 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 138, 149 (1977).
171. Id. at 150.
172. Id. at 151. See also Casanova, Annotations a la applicacion de la
Decision, No. 24: El Caso de Chile (Notes on the application of
Decision 24: The Chilean Case). 15 Derecho de la Inteqracion 239
(1974).
173. See Chile: Decree Law 600, 13 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1176 (1974). "Once
accelerated growth has become the primary objective of development
policy, the implementation of certain economic policies and
structures within the capitalist model is largely proclaimed. In
particular, it becomes obvious that foreign capital and technology
must perform a central function within the developing nation. See
Comment, supra note 170, at 152.
174. "Chile has refused to discuss any other pressing issues until the
matter of foreign capital treatment is resolved .... [It] has
proposed the total elimination of the fade out provision,
particularly for international companies that operate only locally
and do not desire to take advantage of AnCom benefits .... All
members with the exception of Chile adamantly refuse to lift the
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prohibition on the capitalization of technology." AnCom is
Pressured to Focus Attention on U.24 Issue, 1976 Bus. Latin Am.,
217, 218.
175. See Comment, supra note 170, at 156.
176. For a detailed account of the controversy see G. Amador, The
Andean Legal Order 1-44 (1978).
177. See notes 66-102 and accompanying text supra.
178. As originally promulgated D.L. 600 was quite favorable to foreign
investors. It established a Foreign Investment Committee with
which foreign investors were to negotiate contracts. The terms of
the contracts were to be freely negotiated between the parties.
Article 5 guaranteed non-discrimination between foreign and
national capital. Article 6 grants a right to petition (often one
year of rule on provision being in effect) when the investor feels
a provision has discriminated against him.
Chapter V provides for a compensation scheme when foreigners have
suffered damage due to a discriminatory provision. The rules
regarding remittances of profits, taxation, etc. are also more
liberal.
Articles 3 and 19 of D.L. 600 attempted to incorporate Chile's
obligations under LAFTA and the Agreement to the foreign investor:
under art. 19, to be entitled to share in the benefits of LAFTA and
AnCom--a foreign investor must comply with D.L. 600 and all those
other resolutions and decisions arising out of said international
commitments.
179. Art. 34 exempts enterprises exporting 80% or more of their
production outside the common market area. Articles 41-44 allow
exemption but entail loss of the trade benefits.
180. See Comment, supra note 170, at 167.
181. See note 174, supra.
182. These modifications included (1) raising the remittance level to
20% and giving the member an option to raise the limit further,
(2) raising the limit on reinvested profits from 5% to 7%,
(3) using increased capitalization to fade out foreign firms,
(4) granting of medium term credits.
183. See note 176 supra, at 11 (Protocol of Oct. 5).
184. Id. at 12.
185. Decision 102: Cessation for Chile of the Rights and Obligations
derived from the Agreement of Cartagena, 24 Derecho do la
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Inteqracion 163 (1977).
186. See id. Decision 103 at 164, Decision 109 at 165 and Decision 110
at 166. See also AnCom Modification of D.24 Turns Out Quite
ExtensiveinFtealia), 1976 Bus. Latin Am. 292. The principal
changes involve the profit remittance ceiing based on registered
capital and the ceiling on reinvestment for purposes of increasing
the base that are automatic without official approval. The former
goes from 14% to 20 member countries having and option to make it
higher .... Moreover, governments would be free to permit any
portion over 20% to be reinvested. The 5% ceiling for automatic
reinvestment would go to 7%.
187. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
188. See generally Decision 103, art. 1; Chaparro, Las reformas al
Regimen Andino de Inversiones Extranjeras. (Reforms to the Andean
Regime of Foreign Investments) 24 Derecho de la Inteoraci6n 133
(1977).
189. Id. Decision 103, art. 1 and art. 4.
190. See art. 32 and 55 (Industrial Programming section) of the
Agreement.
191. Prior legislation only permitted short-term credit subject to terms
and conditions imposed by the Commission, see art. 17 of the Code
and art. 6 of Decision 103.
192. See note 185 supra, Decision 103, art. 6.
193. Id. at art. 3.
194. See Chaparro, supra note 188 at 135. Decision 103, art. 10.
195. See note 186 supra, Decision 103, art. 7.
196. Id. at art. 8.
197. Id. at art. 11.
198. "Despite specific areas of concern ... executives surveyed
generally have a high regard for Chile's economic performance and
the policies that brought about recovery .... For manufactures,
Chile's main handicap is the modest size of the market ....
Another element ... is the country's liberal tariff policies ....
Cheap duties benefit foreign investors by ridding the economy of
inefficient producers .... At the same time however, low duties
provide international corporations with a very persuasive argument
to service the Chilean market from abroad, rather than setting up
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operations inside the country." Investing in Chile: Corporate
Survey Reveals Pros and Cons, 1978 Bus. Latin Am. 1362.
199. Time limitations prohibit a country-by-country analysis of major
policy variance. Material that can be consulted include Colombia:
The Code as well as the Cartagena Agreement was subjected to
constitutional attack. See specifically Acuerdo de Cartagena: So
constitucionalidad y la de Decision No. 24 en Colombia. (The
Cartagena Agreement: Its constitutionally and that of Decision 24
in Regulation of the Andean Investment Code: Colombia 4 Law. Am.
15 (1972); Peru: See Decree Law 18, 350 on the Law of InU r
(July 17, 1970), 9 Int'l Lea. Mat. 1125 (1970). As to non-Andean
LAFTA members see Argentina: Stebbings, The Argentine Foreign
Investment Law and its Andean Common Market Inspiration, 8 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 280 (1975).
200. Statement by an official of the Bank of Venezuela, Banco de
Venezuela, Boletin de Economias y Financies, Sept. 1960.
201. Carl & Johnson, Venezuela and the Andean Common Market, 7 Den. J.
Int'l L. Pol'v 151, 154 (1978). The article focuses on the
changes in internal law effected by Chile upon joining the Andean
Common Market.
202. "As outlined by the sub-committee, the working paper apparently
reflects private-sector apprehensions about steering away foreign
investors, but manages to blend in some ideas that seem close to
AnCom's restrictive rules .... " Venezuela's Proposed Investment
Law Shows Influence of AnCom Regulations, 1972 Bus. Latin Am. 71.
203. See Andean Commission--Venezuela--Final Act of the Negotiations on
the Entry of Venezuela into the Cartagena Agreement (Lima, February
13, 1973) in 12 Int'l Lea. Mat. 344 (1973); Venezuela Decrees
Concerning the Regulation of Foreign Investment in Accordance with
Decisions of the Andean Pact (Decree No. 62 - April 28, 1974) and
Regulation Governing Common Treatment of Foreign Capital,
Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties Approved by Decisions
No. 24, 37, 37A and 70 of the Commission of the Agreement of
Cartagena (Decree No. 63), 13 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1220 (1974).
204. Acuerdo de Cartagena--Normas sobre Competencia, 10 Derecho de la
Intearaci6n 1953 (1972).
205. Id. at 196.
206. From the wording of the statute, it does not appear that all such
price manipulations is proscribed. The word "indebido" is used.
The word means "unnecessary". Hence a rule of reason might be
applicable.
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207. This apparently goes to agreements to limit production or sale.
208. Note 204 supra, at art. 2.
209. It will be recalled that the Junta is the technical branch of the
Agreement charged with representing the subregional interest. See
id. at app. 1.
210. Id. at art. 3.
211. Id. at art. 4.
212. Id. at art. 5.
213. Id. at art. 6.
214. Id. at art. 7.
215. Id. at art. 8. Art. 9 relates to the factors the Junta shall
consider in its analysis of the situation.
216. Id. at art. 11.
217. Id. at art. 10.
218. The countries seem to be non-Andean-Group Latin States as opposed
to third party non-members, i.e. U.S.
219. Id. at art. 12.
220. Id. at art. 19.
221. Acuerdo de Cartagena: Regimen uniforme de la Empresa multinacional
y reglamento del trataminento applicable al capital subregional.
(Decision 46). 10 Derecho de la Intearacion 190 (1972).
222. Id. at 1, art. 1. Note that the definition is identical to that
employed by Decision 24A (as amended by D.103, art. 1 and also
Decision 46, art. 5). Note also that a foreigner can be a
subregional investor. See id. at art. 10.
223. Id. at art. 2.
224. Id. at art. 3.
225. Id. at art. 4.
226. Id. at ch. II, ch. III, art. 8, 9.
227. Id. at art. 10.
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228. Id. at art. 11.
229. Id. at art. 8. The decision establishes special payment schedule
when investors include Bolivian or Ecuadorian nationals. Id. at
art. 12.
230. Id. at art. 14.
231. Id. at art. 15.
232. Id. at art. 19.
233. Id. at art. 18.
234. Id. at art. 19.
235. Id. at art. 20.
236. Id. at art. 21.
237. Id. at art. 22.
238. See generally Saavedra, El regimen uniforme de la empresa
multinacional en el Grupo Andino, 11 Derecho de la Integracion
(1972); Perezin, Multinational Companies Under the Andean Pact--A
Sweetener for Foreign Investors? 7 Int'l Law 396 (1973).
239. See note 221 supra, at ch. V, art. 28.
240. Id. at art. 30.
241. Id. at art. 31.
242. Id. at art. 34.
243. Id. at art. 33.
244. Id. at art. 36.
245. Id. at art. 35.
246. Id. at art. 37.
247. Acuerdo de Cartagena: Bases para una politica technologica
subregional, 16 Derecho de la Integracion 131 (1974). The decision
is pursuant to mandate oF articles 25, 27, 38, 70 and 106 of the
Agreement, as well as Decisions 24 and 46.
248. Id. at 131-32.
249. The decision envisions a process consisting of several stages.
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During the first stage information is to be exchanged, existing
technological infra-structure is to be perfected and new ones
developed through special projects and incentives. During the
second stage an evaluation is to take place of the results obtained
during the first stage and policy formulated thereon.
The provisions we shall analyze are geared to enable this first
stage to bear fruit. (Among the documents utilized by the
Commission in arriving at the Decision was document Com/XIII/dt.
2/Rev. I which addressed "Fundamental Consideration for a
subregional policy of technological development.") Though time
does not allow a full analysis of the document, it is reproduced at
16 Derecho de la Intearaci6n 138 (1974).
250. See note 247 supra, at ch. II, art. 2(a).
251. Id. at art. 2(c).
252. Id. at art. 4(c).
253. Id. at art. 4(d).
254. Id. at art. 4(f). See also United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Committee on Transfer of Technology. "Legislation and
Regulation on Technology Transfer: Empirical Analysis of Their
Effects in Selected Countries." TD/B/C.6/55 28 August, 1980.
255. See note 247 supra, at ch. III, art. 7(a)(c)(d). The term,
"balance of payments," is not defined.
256. Id. at art. 8.
257. Decision 24, articles 2 and 19 discussed supra.
258. Note 247 supra, at art. 9.
259. Id. at art. 10.
260. Id. at art. 11.
261. Id. at ch. IV, art 12(a).
262. "As opposed to persons or enterprises from third party states." It
is clear that this would not exclude foreign participation since
the enumerated vehicles may all encompass a degree of foreign
participation.
263. Id. at art. 12(b).
264. Id. at art. 12(c).
265. Id. at art. 13. Article 12(e) and (f) mandate member states to
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adopt capitalization schemes for such projects. Article 14
requires the Junta to consider levels of development (and
technological needs) when giving priority to states.
266. Id. at art. 16, 18.
267. Id. at art. 17. The remaining text of the decision relates to
support task and common programming. (Chapter V) and various
disposition, Chapter VI. Chapter V lays down rules and guidelines
for the implementation of such projects. The purpose is to assure
to the fullest extent, possible subregional sharing of benefits.
Such matters include determination by the Junta of the effect of
the technology, a mandate to search in common for solutions to
technological problems, etc. Chapter II provides for other general
matters such as requiring member states to adopt guides by which
the Andean Corporation can participate in such projects.
268. Acuerdo de Cartagena: Propriedad Industrial Reglamento para la
applicacion de las normas sobre propieded industrial, 16 Derecho de
la Inteoraci6n 162 (1974).
269. The chapter is divided into nine sections. The first addresses
requisites for patentability; the second, who can hold titles; the
third, the application process; fourth, how the NCA is to treat the
application; fifth, the rights the patent grants; sixth,
obligations imposed upon the holder; seventh, the system of
licenses; eighth, legal protection; ninth, nullity of the patent.
270. See note 268 supra, at ch. I, § 1, art. 1.
271. Id. at art. 2.
272. id. at art. 2(a)(b).
273. Id. at art. 3.
274. Id. at art. 4.
275. Id. at art. 5.
276. Id. at ch. I, § 2, art. 6.
277. Id. at art. 7.
278. Id.
279. Id. at art. 8.
280. Id. at art. 10.
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281. The statute provides a list of required information at art. 11.
282. Id. at ch. I, § IV, art. 14.
283. Id. at art. 15.
284. Id. at art. 16.
285. Id. at art. 17.
286. Id. at art. 18.
287. Id. at art. 19.
288. Id. at art. 20.
289. Id. at art. 21.
290. Id. at art. 22.
291. Id. at art. 26.
292. Id. at art. 24.
293. Id. at art. 25.
294. Id. at sec. V, art. 28.
295. Id. at art. 29. Originally for five, renewable for five more.
296. Id. at sec. VI, art. 30(a).
297. Id. at art. 30(b).
298. Id. at sec. VII, art. 32. This means, as art. 33 makes cleark,
that the licences must conform to Decision 24 (art. 20).
299. Id. at art. 34. Art. 35 allows the national authority to grant
licences whenever it deems the process requires more than one
exploiter.
300. Id. at art. 38.
301. Id. at art. 41.
302. Id. at art. 42.
303. Id. at ch. II, art. 45-55.
304. Article 55 imposes upon the members the obligation, of subscribing
to the International Classification established by the Arrangement
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of Locarno, October 8, 1968, within a year of the decision's
effective date.
305. Id. at ch. III, § 1, art. 56.
306. Id. at art. 57.
307. This prohibition goes to the form, its color or shape, descriptive
markings or any other signals, any word (in any language) which has
become usual designation (has acquired secondary meaning). Also
forbidden are any unauthorized reproduction of emblems, coats of
arms, markings of a state or international organization, those
marks which may be confused with one already granted, names,
pictures, pseudonyms of living persons or of deceased people
without authorization of their heirs. A person may trademark his
own name as long as it is sufficiently distinctive. Id. at art. 58.
308. Id. at art. 61-67.
309. Id. at art. 68.
310. Id. at art. 72.
311. Manipulated price or quality or entered into other conduct
detrimental to the public. Id. at art. 75.
312. Id. at art. 76.
313. See, e.g., Vicuna, La creacion de un tribunal de justicia en el
Grupo Andino, 15 Derecho de la Integraci6n 31, 33 (1974). For a
study of the principle contlicts involved in legal structures for
integration, see generally Paolillo y Carlos, in Estudio de los
procedimientos de hecho utilizados para la solucion de conflicts en
la ALARL (a study on the proceedings made to solve conflicts in
LAFTA), 9 Derecho de la Intepracion 73 (1971).
314. Zalduendo, El Tribunal Andino de Xusticia, 4 Integracion
Latino-Americpna 32 (1979).
315. The experts at these meetings included Professor Gerard Olivier,
Deputy General Director of the Legal Service of the European
Community and Dr. Pierre Pescapore, a judge on the European court.
Walter Munch, General Director of the Juridical Service of the
Commission of the Communities and Maurice Lagrange,
Attorney-General of the Court of the Communities as well as a host
of Latin jurists.
316. See Zalduendo, supra note 314. The absence of a judicial organ is
explained partly because in the majority of the cases the scheme of
integration was conceived by economists as a relatively simple
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mechanism of free trade .... On the other hand ... (economists
feared) the implantation of an economic scheme which could often
clash with the legal norms enunciated within the traditional
perspectives of national development. It was feared that the
process association with national jurist, who often were not
familiar with the development of international law and the law of
an integration movement could be a factor of paralysis ... above
all the risk of restricted interpretations by national
legislatures. This coupled with the traditional fear of these
states to submit to any international jurisdiction was another
factor. See Vicuna, supra note 313, at 31.
317. See generally Zalduendo, supra note 314; Vicuna, supra note 313 for
a full exposition of the legal theory underlying the relationship
Of the Junta, the Commission and the individual states see Amador,
supra note 176.
318. Zalduendo, supra note 314, at 33.
319. "The structure of the European Economic Community comprehend one
organ, the Council, formed by delegates of the member states which
still look like the traditional international organs but (also)
three additional institutions with different objects ... the
Commission, guardian of the common interest, whose members,
independent and not removable receive their investiture by
collective decision of the states and which are not subjected to
represent the national interest of their country of origin. The
European Parliament, the expression of popular opinion, and the
Court of Justice, custodian of judicial values." Id.
320. Indeed, they get more so each year. See Andean Group: Agreement
establishing the Andean 9ouncil, 3 Int'l Lea. Mat. 612 (1980).
See also Salazar.. Solucion de conflitos interestatales para la
integracion economica y otras formas de cooperaci6n econimica,
28-29 Derecho de la Intearaci6n 20 (1975).
321. Vicuna, supra note 313, at 38.
322. Andean Group: Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the
Cartagena Agreement (Done at Cartagena, May 28, 1979), 18 Int'l
Lea. Mat. 1203 (1979). Since a treaty, it is not dependent upon
the existence of LAFTA. Further should LAFTA fail, the Agreement
of Cartagena would survive as a mechanism of this new treaty. The
preamble states:
Certain that both the stability of the Cartagena
Agreement and the rights and obligations deriving from
it must be safeguarded by a juridical entity at the
highest level, independent of the governments of the
member countries and from the other bodies of the
-170-
Cartagena Agreement, with authority to define
communitarian law, resolve the controversies which
arise under it and to interpret it uniformly.
323. Id. at ch. I, art. 1.
324. Id. at art. 2.
325. Id. at art. 3.
326. Id. at art. 4.
327. Id. at art. 6.
328. Id. at art. 7.
329. Id. at art. 8.
330. Id. at art. 10.
331. Id. at art. 11. These evils are enumerated in the statute of the
Court. The statute is to be approved by the Commission and is to
govern both the functioning of the Court and the judicial procedure
to which the causes of action contemplated by the Treaty shall be
subject. Id. at art. 14. The Commission can also create the
position of Attorney General. Id. at art. 7.
332. Id. at art. 13.
333. Id. at ch. III, art. 17.
334. Id. at art. 19. Note that the foreigner are not specifically
excluded. It is presumed that they can institute such proceedings
since by now foreigners can only own up to 49% of an enterprise.
335. Id. at art. 18.
336. Id. at art. 20.
337. Id. at art. 22.
338. Id. at art. 23.
339. Id. at art. 24.
340. Id. at art. 25.
341. Id. at art. 26.
342. Id. at art. 27.
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343. Id. at art. 30.
344. Id. at art. 33.
345. Id. at art. 36.
346. Id. at art. 38.
